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INTRODUCTION

The recent efforts to "reinvent" the federal government focus on ways
to decrease spending, enhance efficiency, and attract nontax revenue from
the private sector.' The recommendations of the National Performance
Review, headed by Vice President Al Gore, 2 include straight-forward
measures to eliminate wasteful government spending and minimize the
proverbial bureaucratic red tape. 3 Its more creative recommendations urge
government to consider a variety of alternative vehicles for the delivery of
social and economic services, such as government corporations and joint
ventures with private sector interests. 4 These hybrid entities, often
1. The term "reinventing government" was coined by David Osborne and Ted
Gaebler. Their 1992 book brought the notion of entrepreneurial government to the
general public. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT:
How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992).
Osborne delivered a speech in 1990 before the Democratic Leadership Council titled
"Reinventing Government." The Clinton administration embraced the term, and it
became the hallmark of the National Performance Review. See e.g., AL GORE, COMMON
SENSE GOVERNMENT: WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS (1995) [hereinafter COMMON
SENSE]; AL GORE, CREATING A GOvERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS:

THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW (1993) [hereinafter
PERFORMANCE REVIEW] For a discussion of the movement to reinvent government see
infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
2. The National Performance Review was created by President Clinton on March 3,
1993. Its goal was to "create a government that works better and costs less." COMMON
SENSE, supranote 1. For a discussion of the National Performance Review see infranote
41.
3. For a discussion of the recommendations of the National Performance Review see
infra note 41.
4. See PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 1 at 85-86 (stating that, where
appropriate, government should "create market dynamics"). After a brief description of
government corporations, the second National Performance Review Report concludes:
"To get the best value for the taxpayer's dollar, the federal government needs to use these
options more often." Id. at 86.
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referred to as public/private partnerships, promise increased efficiency and
access to nontax revenue. 5
This Article focuses on a subset of these private/public
partnerships-those that involve relationships between the public sector and
charitable organizations, 6 specifically "government created charitable
organizations" (GCCOs).7 In several recent high-profile cases, the federal

government8 elected to use a GCCO to develop and implement certain
5. The term "nontax revenue" differentiates between federal revenue raised through
the exercise of the taxing power and all other federal revenue. It also includes revenue
from private sources that is used to fund the provision of social services on a federal
level, regardless of whether the federal government is directly responsible for the delivery
of those services. Nontax revenue can take the form of fees for services, investment
capital, and charitable contributions.
6. The terms "charitable organization" and "charities" refer to those organizations
classified under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code as exempt from federal income
tax on income related to their exempt function and qualified to receive tax-deductible
contributions under § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 170 (1994).
These terms do not refer to a larger group of tax-exempt organizations, namely those
qualifying for exemption from income tax under other subsections of § 501. With a few
minor exceptions, these organizations are not qualified to receive tax-deductible
contributions. Moreover, the term does not refer to an even larger group of
organizations, namely those organized on a nonprofit basis under relevant state
incorporation laws. These organizations may or may not be exempt from federal income
tax. For an explanation of the common characteristics of charitable organizations see
Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable OrganizationsInfluence Federal Tac Policy: "Rent-

seeking" Charitiesor Virtuous Politicians?,1996 Wis. L. REv. 971.
7. A GCCO is an autonomous or semiautonomous charitable entity used to develop
and/or implement federal social policy and attract nontax revenue, principally in the form
of corporate charitable contributions. For a discussion of GCCOs see infra text
accompanying notes 46-68. A GCCO may be organized formally as a government
corporation. For a discussion of government corporations see infra text accompanying
notes 52-68. This Article does not address the host of constitutional concerns implicated
by the creation of government corporations or GCCOs. Existing somewhere between the
public and the private sector, the character, powers, and accountability of such entities
remain fertile grounds for comment. For a comprehensive treatment of government
corporations see A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995
U. ILL. L. REv. 543.
8. Although the insights of the Article focus solely on the activities of the federal
government, many are equally applicable to state or local government. In fact, many of
the examples from Osborne and Gaebler's blueprint for reinventing government are
innovations undertaken on the state or local level. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supranote
1, at 16-20 (discussing "the emergence of entrepreneurial government").
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social policy initiatives. 9 George Bush, the "Education President" °
championed the creation of the New American Schools Development

Corporation (NASDC) as the cornerstone of his education policy."
Designed as an independent charitable organization, the NASDC's
proposed budget relied on corporate contributions.'
This allowed the
federal government to claim that it could fund its new educational program
without increasing the federal bureaucracy, raising taxes, or cutting other

budget items. 13
To create a government that "works better" (i.e., is more efficient)

and "costs less" (i.e., maximizes access to nontax revenue), a reinvention
literature encourages policy makers to weigh the relative benefits and
burdens associated with locating a particular program in the public,
charitable, or private sectors. 15 For example, the charitable sector is
considered to perform best where "consumer trust" is important, as in the
case of medical care and child care. 16 The private sector, on the other
9. It is common practice for the federal government to enter into contractual
arrangements with charitable organizations under which the organizations agree to provide
certain social services. The federal government also reimburses individuals for services
purchased from charitable organizations, such as hospitals. The innovative feature of
"reinventing government" is that GCCOs are designed to seek alternative funding sources.
"Reinventing government" urges the use of charitable organizations to attract nontax
revenue in the form of principally corporate charitable contributions. See infra text
accompanying notes 48-50 (discussing the use of charitable organizations to provide social
services under contract with the federal government).
10. For a discussion of President Bush's self-identification as the "Education
President" see infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 126-43 and accompanying text (discussing NASDC). The level
of government involvement, accountability, and control depends on the GCCO. In a
more independent model, such as NASDC, the government involvement is limited to that
of catalyst and fundraiser. The highly-structured government corporation, however,
offers the "flexibility of [a] private compan[y] while remaining under government
supervision and control." COMMON SENSE, supra note 1, at 139 (discussing the need to
consider the creation of more government corporations).
12. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (describing NASDC funding).
13. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
14. See COMMON SENSE, supra note 1 (discussing the goal of the National
Performance Review).
15. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1, at 43-45 (discussing the merits of
choosing between the "public sector, private sector, or third sector").
16. See id. at 46. This is a restatement of the "contract failure" theory of nonprofit
organizations. This theory proposes that where asymmetric information regarding the
quality of the service provided exists, consumers feel more comfortable dealing with
organizations that will not exploit the information imbalance to maximize profits. See
infra text accompanying notes 283-300 (explaining the contract failure theory).
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hand, is considered superior where innovation is desired.' 7 Both offer

access to various forms of nontax revenue.'" However, in the case of the

charitable sector, the emphasis is on corporate contributions.' 9
The comparative institutional analysis advocated by reinventing
government is very promising.20 It recognizes that the institution chosen
to deliver the program influences and, to some degree, ultimately
determines the success of the program.2 ' Unfortunately, the level of

analysis is compromised by an obsession with immediate efficiency gains
and access to nontax revenue.

This ignores the effect of GCCOs on

corporations and the charitable community, and leaves little room for
considerations of equity and social justice. 22 Thus, the political exigencies
of reinventing government threaten to reduce its comparative institutional
analysis to nothing more than a short-term cost management tool.
17. See id. at 46 (noting that the private sector "tends to be better at performing
economic tasks, innovating, replicating successful experiments, adapting to rapid change,
abandoning unsuccessful or obsolete activities, and performing complex or technical
tasks.").
18. The different types of nontax revenue available indicate that the locus of an
activity may be constrained by its ability to attract one form of nontax revenue, but not
the other. For example, equity investment is available in the private sector, but not the
charitable sector.
19. The interest was perhaps motivated by the billions of dollars corporations
contribute each year to charitable organizations. For example, in 1995 U.S. corporations
transferred $7.4 billion to charitable organizations.
See AAFRC TRUST FOR
PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 1996, at 88-89 (Ann E. Kaplan ed., 1996) [hereinafter

GIVING USA 1996]. This does not include the $10.4 billion that foundations contributed
to charity. Some of these foundations are related to for-profit corporations (e.g., the
Ford Foundation). Id. at 72-73. For a discussion of the difference between corporate
giving and corporate foundation giving see Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate
Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation,and the Social Construction of
Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, at 13 n.61 (1994). For a discussion of corporate
charitable giving as a potential source of nontax revenue see infra text accompanying
notes 69-74.
20. However, the level of analysis is necessarily constrained by the absence of a
positive theory of the charitable sector, or even agreement as to where the charitable
sector ends and the public and private sectors begin. See infra text accompanying notes
266-73.
21. This is consistent with a renewed interest in legal scholarship with institutional
choice. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN

LAW, ECONOMICS,

AND

PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal

Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARv. L.
REV. 1393 (1996) (discussing the need for a new synthesis of legal discourse that takes
into account social justice).
22. See Rubin, supra note 21, at 1429-33.

NEW YORK LA W SCHOOL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 41

The attempt to quantify the effect of GCCOs on corporations and the
charitable community underscores how little is known about the
composition and actions of the charitable sector. GCCOs represent yet
another instance where policy choices are based on largely unexamined
assumptions concerning the nature of charitable organizations. 23 For
example, significant tax subsidies rest on certain assumptions about the
charitable community for which there is very little empirical support: such
as charitable organizations deliver social services more efficiently than
government, and they "lessen the burdens" of government in a meaningful
way. 24 Reinventing government uses these same assumptions to determine
questions of institutional choice.
Although a comprehensive review of the charitable sector is long
overdue, the scope of this article is much more modest. Part II discusses
the movement to reinvent government and identifies GCCOs as a
recommended form of service delivery.' Part III places GCCOs within
the context of the federal government's interest in corporate contributions
as a source of nontax revenue, beginning with the enactment of increased
tax incentives for corporate giving during the Reagan administration.2 6
Part IV examines some of the unintended consequences of the introduction
of GCCOs, 27 including (i) the increased burden placed on certain
corporations to provide funding for social services through nontax, albeit
tax-subsidized, dollars;28 (ii) the corresponding opportunity for corporate
donors to influence the development and implementation of federal social
policy; 29 (iii) the introduction of the federal government as a competitor
23. This lack of empirical information continues despite generous and costly tax
subsidies for charitable activities and a growing reliance by the federal government on
charitable organizations to provide social services.
24. Other related assumptions are that tax subsidies are necessary to encourage
individual volunteer and other charitable efforts, and that tax subsidies are a cost-effective
way to support such programs. See Knauer, supra note 6. Existing economic models of
the charitable community are of limited help because they posit the creation of charitable
organizations in the absence of tax subsidies. These models are then used to justify the
continuation of tax subsidies.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 46-68.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 69-109 (describing the evolution of the
government's interest in corporate contributions as a source of nontax revenue).

27. As with any innovation, the development of GCCOs may yield certain
unintended consequences.

See EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK:
TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES (1996) (explaining

the "revenge effects" of innovations in the scientific field).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 191-202.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 203-21.
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for charitable contributions;3 0 and (iv) the resulting de facto creation of a
preferred class of charitable organizations. 31 It also offers a public choice
analysis of the corporate funding of GCCOs.32 Part V discusses the
definitional and descriptive shortcomings of any comparative institutional
analysis involving the charitable sector,33 and revisits the accepted
economic models of the charitable organization in light of the emergence
of the government as a charitable entrepreneur. 34
II. REINVENTING GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
A. Reinventing Government
The central challenge of reinventing government is to improve the
delivery of government services without increasing spending. 35 The
blueprint for reinventing government is David Osborne and Ted Gaebler's
1992 book, Reinventing Government: How the EntrepreneurialSpirit Is
Transforming the Public Sector,36 which presents entrepreneurial
government as an alternative to the choice between big government or no
government.37 An entrepreneurial government tries to reconcile the fact
that although it is not politically feasible to raise taxes,38 taxpayers want
better (not fewer) government services and continued deficit reduction.39
It does this through the introduction of a series of cost-cutting and
performance enhancing reforms, as well as measures to maximize sources
30. See infra text accompanying notes 222-34.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 235-43.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 244-65.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 266-73.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 274-300.
35. This differs from the New Federalism espoused by the Reagan administration,
which looked to the public sector in lieu of government. "Reinventing government,"
therefore, reflects an ideological view concerning the appropriate role of the federal
government in the provision of social services. See infratext accompanying notes 35-45.
36. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1. The paperback edition bears the
following endorsement from President Clinton. "Should be read by every elected official
in America. This book gives us the blueprint."
37. See id. at xix (defining "entrepreneurial government" as a new model of efficent
and effective government).
38. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Processas Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980's, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1 (1990).

39. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1, at 22 (explaining that taxpayers "do
not want less education, fewer roads, less health care, [but] better education, better roads
and better health care").
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of nontax revenue. n0 Practiced to some degree by the Bush administration,

it was the Clinton administration that embraced the notion of an
entrepreneurial government and set out to create a government that "works
better on less money. "41
A key component of entrepreneurial government is a willingness
to consider alternative forms of service delivery.42 When designing (or
redesigning) a government program, policy makers consider delivery
models other than the traditional model of government-funded public
employees. 43 They evaluate the relative benefits associated with
conducting the program directly, privatizing the service, or constructing
40. See id. at 22-24.
41. On March 3, 1993, President Clinton announced the creation of the National
Performance Review with the ambitious goal to create a government that "works better
on less money." Remarks Announcing the National Performance Review, 1 PUB. PAPERS
233, 235 (Mar. 3, 1993). Initially staffed by 250 career civil servants and a wide variety
of consultants, including David Osborne, the first report of the National Performance
Review made 384 recommendations for action designed to save $108 billion. The
organization issued this report six months after the organization's creation. The report
was titled: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS.
In an effort to make government more accessible, the National Performance Review
maintains an extensive Internet web site. The address of the site is http://www.npr.gov.
The web site contains all of the reports, related executive orders, and associated news
stories. See A Brief History of the National PerfonnanceReview ,http://www.npr.gov/
homepage/2366.html,.
After its first report, the National Performance Review downsized to a staff of
approximately 50. It has since issued two additional reports. The Clinton administration
now refers to the efforts of the National Performance Review as Phase I and Phase II.
Phase I focused primarily on improving customer service and eliminating wasteful
spending, and introduced such reforms as new procurement procedures, introduction of
quality management, and negotiated rulemaking. President Clinton announced Phase II
on December 19, 1994, and directed Vice President Gore to focus on regulation reform,
government partnerships, and alternative delivery forms. These alternative forms include
franchising certain government functions to privately-owned firms, forming partnerships
with state and local governments, and the forming government corporations.
42. Osborne and Gaebler describe 36 different alternative delivery formats, four of
which relate directly to GCCOs. They are "public/private partnerships," "quasi-public
corporations," catalyzing efforts of nongovernmental organizations, and providing seed
money to charitable initiatives. OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1, at 31 (listing 36
alternatives).
43. Osborne and Gaebler provide extensive instructions on how to evaluate different
forms of service delivery. See id. at 31 (listing 36 alternatives to "service delivery by
public employees"). With regard to public employees, GCCO employees are not covered
by civil service protections.

19971

REINVENTING GOVERNMENT

some form of partnership with the private or charitable sectors.'
In
addition to different strengths and weaknesses, all three sectors offer a
variety of sources of nontax revenue, but only the charitable sector offers
the possibility of attracting charitable contributions.45
B. Government Created Charitable Organizations (GCCOs)
The public/charity partnerships advocated by "Reinventing
Government" offer a twofold benefit; increased efficiency from use of a
charitable form,' and access to nontax revenue, principally in the form of
corporate contributions.47 Standing alone, there is absolutely nothing new
about suggesting that the federal government use charitable organizations
for the delivery of certain social services.4 8 For some time, the federal
government has relied on charitable organizations to provide social
services either under government contracts or through various
reimbursement schemes, such as Medicare.4 9 Under this contract model
44. See id. at 47 (discussing the merits of privatization). Osborne and Gaebler state
that this differs from choosing between a government run program and a privately run
program. See id.
45. All three sectors potentially offer access to fees for services. In recent years the
government has instituted user fees. It is curious that the government would turn to the
charitable sector as a source of nontax revenue, given that one justification for tax
subsidies is that charities are unable to attract funding.
46. The presumed superior efficiency of the charitable form continues despite the
lack of empirical support. See infra text accompanying notes 266-73.
47. For a description of the level of corporate contributions to charity see supranote
19.
48. See generally Lester M. Salamon, Partners in Public Service: The Scope and
Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK 99 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) (documenting "an extensive pattern of
government reliance on private nonprofit groups to carry out public purposes").
Abramson and Salamon term this phenomenon "nonprofit federalism" where government
relies on charitable organizations to provide social services. ALAN J.ABRAMSON &
LESTER M. SALAMON, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND THE NEW FEDERAL BUDGET 56-57
(1986).
49. See Salamon, supra note 48, at 99. The practice of relying on charitable
organizations to deliver federally funded social services became prevalent during the
"Great Society" programs of the 1960s. Historian Peter Hall points to this period as the
beginning of a time of tremendous growth in the charitable sector. See PETER DOBKIN
HALL, INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND OTHER ESSAYS ON PHILANTHROPY,

VOLUNTARISM, AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (1992).

Hall explains that "[t]he

voluntary sector, rather than constituting an alternative to the welfare state, was largely
its creation: between 30 percent and 60 percent of its revenues came from direct or
indirect government subsidies." Id. at 7.
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of a public/charity partnership, the service is federally funded because the
federal government pays the charity to provide the service, or it
reimburses the individual who purchases the service."
A GCCO,
however, is an autonomous or semiautonomous charitable entity used to
develop and/or implement federal social policy and attract nontax revenue,
principally in the form of corporate charitable contributions. 5' A GCCO
is only partially funded by federal spending.
It is important to distinguish a subset of GCCOs, specifically, the
government charitable corporations that belong to a larger group of
organizations known as government corporations.
As a matter of
52
institutional choice, government corporations are not a new phenomenon.
Ever since McCulloch v. Mwyland,53 the federal government has created
government corporations to provide insurance and financial services, 4
produce electric power, 55 and run passenger rail service. 6 Particularly in
50. Although the federal government pays for the services, it benefits from using the
pre-existing organization. The government does not have to duplicate the same type of
delivery system that is already in place. The goal of "contracting out" is to hold down
spending and increase efficiency. Criticisms of the contract model are many: the
charitable provider faces mountains of paperwork, the services delivered are not
sufficiently monitored, the federal funds impinge on the charity's autonomy and distort
its charitable activities. See, e.g., Salamon, supra note 48, at 103-06. The contract
model early reliance did not directly rely on corporate funding, although contributions to
the charities ultimately offset the expenses associated with service delivery such as
administrative expenses and other overhead.
51. A GCCO is funded at least in part by private funds. GCCOs typically rely on
initial start-up funding from Congress. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 63-66.
In Great Britain, the acronym QUANGO refers to Quasi Autonomous Nongovernmental
Organization. Denis P. Doyle, The Role of Private Sector Management in Public
Education, 76 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 128, 130 (1994) (describing the difference between
NASDC and QUANGOs). QUANGOs are more equivalent to government charitable
corporations discussed infra text accompanying notes 52-66.
52. For a discussion of institutional choice see KOMESAR, supra note 21.
53. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding the creation of the Second Bank of
the United States as within the Necessary and Proper clause of the Constitution).
54. Many government corporations provide financial services, such as the Federal
Crop Insurance Corporation and the Commodity Credit Corporation. See 15 U.S.C. §
714 (1994). See infra text accompanying notes 64-66.
55. The Tennessee Valley Authority is a government corporation. See 16 U.S.C.
§§ 831-31d(l) (1994).
56. The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) is a government
corporation.
Its purpose is to "[p]rovide intercity and commuter rail passenger
transportation in the United States." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS: PROFILES OF EXISTING GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 7 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 GAO REPORT].
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times of fiscal restraint, when demands for less federal government are
strongest, these separate organizations offer an opportunity to conduct
certain policy initiatives "off budget."" 7 They further appeal to reinvention
advocates because they embody the notion of entrepreneurial government
by "gaining the flexibility of private companies while remaining under
government supervision and control. " 58
Although reinventing 59government has sparked renewed interest in
government corporations, the General Accounting Office (GAO) is not
even clear as to how many government corporations exist. The problem
stems from the lack of a "comprehensive descriptive definition of or
criteria" for government corporations.'
A 1995 GAO Report found
twenty-two self-reported government corporations and five other entities
that are generally considered to be government corporations. This differed
considerably from a 1988 GAO Report prepared for the House Committee
on Government Operations which identified forty-seven government
corporations. 6 ' In the absence of a uniform definition, the GAO defines
a government corporation as a "federally chartered entit[y] created to serve
a public function of a predominantly business nature. "62
57. See Froomkin, supra note 7, at 547 (suggesting government corporations "exist
as accounting devices to hide the true size of the budget deficit").
58. PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 138-39 (noting the need to reduce the
"monopolistic control many government agencies have over their customers" by
reinventing some programs as government corporations). The National Performance
Review describes the possible control mechanism as follows: "[g]overnment exerts control
through a combination of limited operational and management controls, (board member,
owner of preferential stock, budget review authority, appropriations, etc.) and regulatory
control. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW AND OMB, PRIVATIZATION RESOURCE
GUIDE AND STATUS REPORT 2 (1995) [hereinafter PRIVATIZATION REPORT].

59. The GAO completed a report in 1995 profiling seven proposed government
corporations.

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS -

PROFILES OF RECENT PROPOSALS (1995). This report included the proposal by the
National Performance Review to privatize part of the Federal Aviation Administration.
Only one of the proposals called for the creation of a charitable government corporation.
The Presidio Trust would operate and manage the historic Presidio properties in
California, currently the site of the Sixth Army Headquarters.
60. 1995 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 2 (explaining the need for a uniform
definition).
61. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PROFILES ON EXISTING GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS

(1989).

62. 1995 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 1. This definition is based on the
characteristics of a government corporation identified by President Truman in his 1948
budget message. In addition, the Government Corporation Control Act lists wholly
owned and mixed ownership government corporations. 31 U.S.C. §§ 9101-10 (1994).
The list, however, is not exhaustive. See Froomkin, supra note 7, at 549-52.
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Typically, government corporations rely on a core amount of federal

funding. They then supplement, or in the current lexicon, "leverage," this
amount with other forms of nontax revenue, including fees for services,

debt, equity capital, and charitable contributions.

Many government

corporations are organized on a for-profit basis and depend on investment
capital 63 and some government corporations depend on private giving.'
The type of nontax revenue raised is a function of the organization's
purpose. For example, organizations that provide economic services, such
as financial lending, tend to be organized on a for-profit basis to attract
investment capital. Organizations that provide social or cultural services,
such as the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, are organized on a
nonprofit basis and are qualified to receive tax-deductible contributions. 66
Charitable government corporations, such as the Corporation for
National Service, exist as the most highly-structured and closely-controlled
of the GCCOs. 67 In the case of the Corporation for National Service,
63. Indeed, the definition used by the GAO includes a requirement that the
government function performed by the government corporation is of a "business nature."
See 1995 GAO REPORT, supra note 56. The distinction between the for-profit and the
charitable government corporation can get very complicated. For example, the for-profit
Federal National Mortgage Association has a charitable private foundation. See Fannie

Mae Fund Gets $350-Million, CHRON.

OF PHILANTHROPY,

Jan. 11, 1996, at 14.

64. For a discussion of President Clinton's fundraising efforts on behalf of the
Corporation for National Service see infra note 146. Virtually everyone is familiar with
the ubiquitous fund drives of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
65. A list of the 22 self-reported government corporations contains numerous
organizations offering financial and insurance services. In addition to the ones mentioned
above, these organizations include: Community Development Financial Institutions Fund,
Export-Import Bank of the United States, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Government National Mortgage Association, National Credit Union Administration
Central Liquidity Facility, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation, and The Financing Corporation (the financing vehicle for the
FDIC). See 1995 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 7-8.
66. The status of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting remains unclear. The
GAO considers it a government corporation, but the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
self-reports as a "private nonprofit corporation." 1995 GAO REPORT, supranote 56, at
21.
67. It is important to remember that a government corporation is only one variation
of a GCCO and not the most common. The National Performance Review report on
privatization makes this point very clear. It provides the following explanation:
Setting up a government corporation, however, is only one of several
privatization-like approaches which can be taken. In fact, some have said that
"delegating a government function to a government corporation is not the same
as privatizing it." The point to be made here is that the focus of NPR Phase
II is to enable the government to more effectively focus on those things which
it should and can do, and to put incentives in place to cause these things to
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many members of Congress object to it precisely because of its structure.
Recent budget debates targeted the Corporation for National Service for
termination as an example of wasteful "big government." Some members
of Congress used the Points of Light Foundation, a GCCO that is not a
government corporation, as an example of how government efforts to
encourage volunteerism should be organized. 68 Accordingly, the perceived
advantage of greater government control is actually a distinct disadvantage
in certain quarters.
III. RAISING CORPORATE NONTAX REVENUE: THREE MODELS

The contemporary interest in corporate giving as a potential funding9
source for social services predates the movement to reinvent government.
It began with President Reagan's 1981 Task Force on Private Initiatives,
and it continues today as a major component of President Clinton's
Corporation for National Service. 7 ' The reasons behind the preference for
corporate contributions over individual contributions are not clearly
articulated,7 2 but it may be the result of very pragmatic concerns. For
example, it takes fewer resources to secure several large contributions
from corporations than smaller gifts from many individuals. 73 Further, the
perform optimally. New and different types of partnerships continue to emerge
to meet this challenge, including some that are not easily categorized.
See PRIvATIZATION REPORT, supra note 58, at 7-8.
68. The Points of Light Foundation was created pursuant to authorizing legislation.
42 U.S.C. § 12662(b) (1994).
69. Congress enacted the corporate charitable contribution deduction to encourage
corporate giving in 1935. Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, 49 Stat. 1014.
For a brief discussion of the scope of the deduction see infra text accompanying notes 96110. At that time, the federal government wanted to encourage corporate gifts to private
charitable concerns, as opposed to government sponsored charities. See Knauer, supra
note 19, at 15-19 (discussing the history of the federal government and corporate giving
from World War I to the enactment of the deduction in 1935).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 80-91.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 144-61.
72. This may seem surprising given that contributions from individuals far surpass
contributions from corporations both in amount and percentage of taxable income. In
1995, individuals gave approximately $116.23 billion to charitable organizations, and
corporations gave only $7.4 billion. See GIVING USA 1996, supra note 19, at 54-55, 8889.
73. The Conference Board reports that a "core group" of 233 companies gave a
median amount of $2,863,884. THE CONFERENCEBOARD, CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS,

1990, REPORT No. 989, at 11. Later reports drop the median figure and instead report
corporate contributions as a percentage of pretax income. See, e.g., THE CONFERENCE
BOARD, CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS, 1994, REPORT No. 1150-95-RR. 12 (reporting that
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federal government may have more influence over the donative patterns of
corporate taxpayers. 74
This section examines three different government approaches to
attracting nontax corporate funding for the delivery of social services."
The Reagan administration sought to encourage contributions to private
charity through tax incentives and urging the importance of corporate
social responsibility.7 6 The Bush administration saw a slightly more
expanded role for government as a catalyst for certain charitable sector
initiatives, such as the Points of Light Foundation" and NASDC. 78 The
Clinton administration further expanded this role and created the ultimate
hybrid entity-a charitable government corporation-to run the national
service program.79 In each case, the goal of attracting corporate
contributions remains the same. It is the form and the degree of
government control that varies.

companies give a median of 0.9% of pre-tax income to charity). The average total
charitable contributions deduction for individual taxpayers with taxable income of
$75,000-99,999 is $2,315. Jennifer Moore et al., Small Drop in Gifts Shown in New
Tac Study, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, June 27, 1996, at 35 (citing study by the
Research Institute of America showing a slight drop in the average charitable contribution
deduction claimed by individual taxpayers from 1993 to 1994). Only individual taxpayers
who can "itemize" their deductions (i.e., aggregate of itemized deductions exceed the
standard deduction) can claim a charitable contribution deduction.
74. This could be due to two reasons. The U.S. government might just be a
particularly unsympathetic donee. In other words, individuals will just not contribute to
the U.S. government. Even though this makes practical sense, it does not account for the
$20.7 million the U.S. government received in contributions for fiscal year ended
September 30, 1994, mostly from individuals. See Charles A. Jaffe, $52 Million Down,
Trillions to go as Many Chip in on US Debt, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 1995, at 1 (noting
that gifts are processed by the Bureau of Public Debt, Gift to Reduce Public Debt
Department G. and contributions over $5 receive an acknowledgment).
The alternative is that government simply has more leverage in persuading
corporations to give. Id. (describing the gifts to reduce the national debt from the makers
of Eskimo Pies). For a public choice analysis of government officials seeking to extract
"rents" from corporate donors see infra text accompanying notes 244-65.
75. Each of the initiatives discussed below began with the Executive branch. The
impetus for creation could just as easily have come from Congress.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 80-109.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 111-25.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 126-43.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 144-61.
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A. The New Federalism and Tax Incentivesfor Corporate Giving
The budget policies of the Reagan administration sought to decrease
the involvement of the federal government in the provision of social
services. 8" This emerging conservative view of the federal government did
not question the need for certain social services. Instead, it shifted the
responsibility for the provision of such services to the private charitable
sector, 1 including the responsibility for raising the necessary funds from
nontax revenue generated by private sector giving and other volunteer
efforts. 82 The reallocation was based on the belief that the charitable
sector functions independently of, and more efficiently than, the federal
government. 83 The federal government enacted tax cuts and tax incentives
to increase corporate and individual giving' in order to fill the gap in
resources caused by the budget reductions.' These incentives sought to
do indirectly what the government would not undertake to do directly.86
Leaving aside any questions of the superior efficiency of the charitable
sector, the logic was flawed because it did not appreciate the degree to
80. The theory was that tax cuts would spur economic recovery. This in turn would
reduce unemployment and thereby make taxpayers more able to contribute to private
charity. The resulting increase in contributions would fill the gaps caused by the budget
reductions. See HALL, supranote 49, at 89.
81. See Knauer, supra note 6, at 1062 (discussing the reallocation).
82. This view of the federal government also involved increasing the responsibility
of state and local government.
83. See Salamon, supranote 48, at 110 (discussing the notion that the contract model
was motivated by "concerns about efficiency and economy").
84. Osborne and Gaebler referred to this as the belief that tax cuts would "liberate"
the charitable dollar. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1, at 45 (noting Reagan's
belief that "by cutting public sector spending, we could liberate voluntary efforts from
the oppressive arm of the government").
85. The extent to which private giving can fill the gap created by Federal spending
cuts has received extensive coverage. See Sanford Cloud, Jr., The Changing Role of
Government and Its Impact on the Nonprofit and Business Sectors, in THE CORPORATE
CONTRIBUTIONS HANDBOOK:

DEVOTING PRIVATE MEANS TO PUBLIC NEEDS 50, 55

(James P. Shannon ed., 1991); ABRAMSON & SALAMON, supra note 48, at 82-90
(concluding it is unlikely that private giving could make up for the short-fall).
86. A tax incentive represents a policy decision to subsidize certain economic
activities through exclusions, deductions, or credits. The subsidy is indirect in the sense
that it is administered through the tax code rather than paid directly to the intended
beneficiary of the subsidy. Tax expenditure theory characterizes the exclusions,
deductions, and credits driven by social and economic policy as the equivalent of direct
government expenditures. It measures policy driven adjustments to the tax base as the
amount of foregone federal revenue (i.e., the tax that would have been collected in the
absence of the adjustment). See Knauer, supranote 6, at 1059-62.
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which charitable organizations were dependent upon federal revenue in the
form of government contracts, reimbursements, and direct grants. 7 The
budget policies reduced spending and at the same time asked the charitable
sector to do more. 88 The significant reduction in receipts from federal
sources, however, jeopardized the ability of the sector to maintain its
current load, let alone expand its services.8 9
The emphasis on corporate contributions was evident in the nature of
the tax incentives enacted to spur charitable giving. Early in his first
term, President Reagan formed the Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives
to study corporate philanthropy "in the hope of tapping the resources of
the private sector to offset the effects of the revenue shortfall that would
result from federal spending cuts."90 The Task Force's only concrete
recommendation was to raise the amount a corporation could claim as a
charitable deduction in any given year. 9' Congress seized on the idea of
increased tax incentives for corporate giving and enacted a series of tax
incentives to encourage contributions from private industry as part of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA). 92 Congress did not provide
87. Indeed, in the wake of the rhetoric designed to increase private contributions,
it is easy to lose sight of the fact that private giving only represents a small percentage
of the total revenues of charitable organizations. See ABRAMSON & SALAMON, supra note
48, at 19.
88. Further, private giving would not have to provide a dollar for dollar match
because private charity could deliver the services in a more efficient manner. President
Reagan's first five proposed budgets reduced charitable funding (through programs other
than Medicare and Medicaid) by 27% (or $23 billion) over 1980 spending levels. See
ABRAMSON & SALAMON, supra note 48, at 68. The budget cuts disproportionately
affected community development organizations and social service organization, which
experienced a 44% and 40% decrease over 1980 levels, respectively. See id. at 27.
89. See ABRAMSON & SALAMON, supra note 48, at 90. Today, charitable
organizations routinely point to these initial budget reductions as the beginning of
financial uncertainty within the sector.
90. Peter Dobkin Hall, Business Giving and Social Investment in the U.S., in
PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES

AND

GOALS 221, 237 (Richard Magat

ed., 1989).
91. Id. See infratext accompanying notes 94-102 (discussing the ceiling limitations).
The charitable deduction reduces the after-tax cost of the contribution by the donor's
top marginal rate of tax. Thus, a taxpayer whose top marginal rate of tax was 40%
would save $40 in taxes that it would otherwise have had to pay without the $100
deductible charitable contribution. (This assumes that the taxpayer is entitled to deduct
the full amount in the year of the gift.) The taxpayer's after-tax cost of the contribution
is $60 ($100 less the $40 tax savings).
92. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 142
(codified as amended in numerous sections of titles 26, 42 and 45 of the United States
Code). The legislative history accompanying the ERTA provisions expresses the desire
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a comparable increase in tax incentives for individual charitable giving.93
The most widely-touted tax incentive was the increase in the ceiling
limitation on the corporate charitable contribution deduction from five
percent to ten percent of the corporate taxpayer's "contribution base." 94
Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code allows individuals and
corporations an income tax deduction for amounts contributed "to or for
the use of" qualified charitable organizations. 95 The amount of the
to increase corporate giving-a policy necessitated by the social spending cuts initiated
by the Reagan Administration. For persuasive authority, Congress appealed to a
corporation's sense of "social responsibility." Senator Byrd remarked, "I feel that the
corporations of our nation have an obligation.., to the various charities of our country,
and I have felt for sometime that the 5 percent limitation was not a particularly reasonable
one." Id. at 162. 127 CONG. REc. 58353 (daily ed. July 24, 1981). Senator Kennedy
voiced similar concerns noting the need to "bring the corporations of this country into the
process of meeting the needs of the people of our society." Id. at S8352.
93. The 1986 Tax Reform Act did not extend the expiring charitable contribution
deduction for nonitemizers. Further, the reduction in tax rates increased the marginal cost
of deductible charitable giving. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAx POLICY
AND CHARITABLE GIVING (1985) (explaining the relation between tax rates and the
marginal cost of deductible charitable contributions).
94. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(B) (1994).
95. All section references refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended,
and the regulations thereunder. Section 170(a) allows the deduction generally for a
"charitable contribution." Section 170(c) defines the term and provides, in pertinent part:
Charitable Contribution Defined. For purposes of this section, the term
"charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession
thereof, or under the law of the United States, any State, or the
District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of the
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or
for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inure to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual; and
(D) which is not disqualified from tax exemption under section
501(c)(3) by reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which
does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), and political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 170(c) (1994).
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deduction that can be claimed in any one year is limited by a ceiling.96 In
the case of a corporate taxpayer, the ceiling is expressed as a percentage
of the taxpayer's taxable income calculated without regard to any net
operating loss or capital loss carryback.9 7 The corporate taxpayer is
entitled to carry forward any unused portion for five years, subject to the
same ceiling limitation.98 The pre-ERTA percentage amount was five
percent,99 which ERTA increased to ten percent. This doubled the amount
a corporation could claim as a charitable contribution deduction in any
given year,' °° subject to the same carryover rules for any unused
amounts.'°' In the end, the increase represented a case of wishful thinking
because virtually no corporation sustained contributions that even
approached the old five percent limit. 0 2
ERTA also added two tax incentives for certain corporate
contributions of inventory and short-term capital gain property' 0 3 in the
case of scientific equipment to certain charitable educational
organizations, 4 and corporate gifts to certain charitable organizations for
96. Section 170(b)(1) sets forth the limitation rules applicable to individuals. Section
170(b)(2) sets forth the limitation rules applicable to corporate taxpayers. See I.R.C. §
170(b)(1), (2) (1994).

97. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(B) (1994).
98. See I.R.C. § 170(d)(2)(A) (1994).
99. The ceiling limitation had been five percent ever since the enactment of the
corporate charitable deduction in 1935. See Knauer, supra note 19, at 19 n.93.
100. Implicit in the increase was the assumption that the charitable giving of at least
some corporations approached the five percent limitation and that a corporation would not
increase its giving beyond the five percent limit in the absence of an immediate tax
deduction. This seems to have been wishful thinking on the part of Congress.
Accordingly, the change in the ceiling levels affected the giving patterns of very few
corporations. This seems to have been the case notwithstanding the directive of Richard
Eells, an early proponent of corporate giving, that "companies with a program that will
benefit the company while it benefits society should be encouraged to exceed the 5 per
cent limit-to the extent of prudence."
FREE SOCIETY 141 (1956).

RICHARD EELLS, CORPORATION GIVING IN A

101. See I.R.C. § 170(d)(2)(A) (1994).
102. Cf. Susan Gray, Dayton Hudson Corporation's5% Philanthropy Tradition
Turns 50, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, July 11, 1996, at 17 (reporting that the Dayton
Hudson department store chain has donated five percent of its pre-tax income to charity
since 1946).
103. See Knauer, supra note 19, at 33 n.183 (discussing the various contribution
reduction and limitation rules).
104. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(3)(B) (1994).
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use in "the care of the ill, needy or infants. "105 Generally, such preERTA contributions were deductible only to the extent of the taxpayer's
basis or cost in the property. 0 6 To illustrate, assume that a corporate
taxpayer manufactures items at a cost of $50 per item, but sells each one
for $100. Pre-ERTA law restricted the corporate taxpayer's charitable
deduction to $50 (its cost) for each item contributed, regardless of the
nature of the property or its intended use.
The ERTA changes permit a corporate taxpayer, but not an
individual, 0 7 to deduct cost plus one-half of the difference between cost
and the sales price, provided the amount deducted does not exceed twice
cost. 108 Thus, in the previous example the corporation would be entitled
to deduct $75 for each item donated ($50 cost plus $25 (one-half cost)). 0 9
B. Government as Catalyst
The Bush administration also concentrated on increasing voluntary
contributions in order to hold down federal spending. Its efforts,
however, went one step further than the indirect assistance offered by the
ERTA tax incentives. 1
President Bush saw a role for the federal
government as a catalyst for private charitable initiatives. This view led
to the formation of two important GCCOs: The Points of Light
Foundation and NASDC.

105. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(3)(A) (1994). This new rule was designed to encourage
specific types of gifts and to provide corporations with an alternate means of disposing
excess inventory. See Knauer, supra note 19, at 78-79 (discussing the development of
a secondary market in qualifying items where a third party acts as a clearinghouse
matching qualified organizations with donors possessing excess inventory).
106. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(2) (1994).
107. The ERTA rules also do not apply to subchapter "S" corporations. See I.R.C.
§ 170(e)(3)(A) (1994).
108. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(3)(A).
109. To illustrate the "not to exceed twice cost limitation," assume that the item sells
for $100 but only costs the corporation $20 to make. In such cases, section 170(e)(3)
permits deductions not exceeding $40 (twice cost) even though cost ($20) plus one-half
of the difference between the selling price ($100) and cost ($20) equals $60.
110. Special tax incentives for charitable gifts figured prominently in Bob Dole's
presidential campaign platform. His proposal would have given individual taxpayers a
tax credit of up to $500 for contributions to organizations that work to alleviate poverty.
Jennifer Moore et al., The Debate Over Dole's Tax Credit, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY,
June 13, 1996, at 9.
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1. The Points of Light Foundation

The Points of Light Foundation takes its name from a reference in a
speech where Bush likened individual volunteers to "A Thousand Points
of Light.""' The Foundation is an enabling organization, and its purpose
is "to motivat[e] leaders to mobilize others for community service directed
at solving the most serious social problems facing society today. " " 2 Like
the ERTA tax incentives, it is designed to increase the level of private
giving-not to provide any direct social services.
The Foundation is organized and operated as a separate charitable
corporation. It is exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3)
and qualifies to receive tax-deductible contributions."' The Foundation's
literature stresses its "independent" character.' "4 Its Annual Report
mentions former President Bush, but only at the end of a long list of
acknowledgments. '5
The choice to create the Foundation as an independent corporation was
significant. Its activities could have easily been administered by the White
111. This was President Bush's acceptance speech at the 1988 Republican
convention. See Bush's "Points of Light" Volunteerism Burns on With Clinton's Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1993, at A22. Each week during his presidency, Bush designated
individuals as "Points of Light." The program was coordinated by the White House
Office on National Service. The goal was to designate 1,000 "Points of Light" before
the end of the administration. Bush continued to name individuals until the last week of
his administration and managed to meet that goal with a few to spare. See Points of Light
1,004 to 1,020, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 26, 1993, at 12.
112. POINTS OF LIGHT FOUNDATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1992, at 3, 5, 13, 15, 17.
113. Although authorized by legislation, the Foundation is not a government
corporation. Cf. 1995 GAO REPORT supranote 56 (illustrating examples of a government
corporation).
114. The Foundation's 1995 ANNUAL REPORT describes the organization as follows:
The Points of Light Foundation is an independent 501(c)(3) organization
that works with the support of caring Americans who believe that volunteerism
can be a powerful antidote to the social problems that afflict neighborhoods and
communities. The Foundation was established in 1990 as an outgrowth of the
vision of many distinguished American leaders, among them the members of
the Kean Commission, chaired by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean,
a politically diverse group of prominent Americans from all sectors of society,
the bipartisan members of Congress who crafted the Community and National
Service Act, and President George Bush.
POINTS OF LIGHT FOUNDATION, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, WORKING TOGETHER
COMMITTED VOLUNTEERS CAN SOLVE PROBLEMS (inside cover).

115. See id.
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House Office of National Service." 6 Instead, the President chose to create
(or caused to be created) a new independent organization for which he then
secured start-up funding from Congress. 7 Many of the activities of the
White House Office of National Service reinforced those of the
Foundation, most notably the Presidential "Points of Light""' recognition
program where each week the White House designated individuals who
volunteered as a "Point of Light." These presidential activities, however,
remained separate from those of the Foundation."19
One obvious result of this institutional choice is that the Foundation
continues today, whereas the Presidential "Points of Light" recognition
program for individuals does not. 120 A GCCO institutionalized the policy
and insulated it from a partisan shift in policy. Thus, unlike many
presidential policy initiatives, the Foundation has, at least in form if not
substance, an identity or existence separate and distinct from the
administration which created and supported it.' 2 '
Notwithstanding the Foundation's close association with President
Bush, President Clinton incorporated the Foundation as part of his national
116. In the alternative, the President could have entrusted it to a Cabinet department
or designated a representative in each department to be coordinated by the White House.
117. The initial funding was $10 million. This was reduced to $5 million for 1993
and subsequent years. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1994, at A-277. President Clinton's 1997 Budget
earmarks $6 million for the Points of Light Foundation. See infra note 228 (detailing the
proposed budget).
118. For a description of the program see supra notes 111-12 and accompanying
text.
119. The White House Office of National Service also published a book titled
See
Michael Kinsley, Charity Begins With Government, TIME, Apr. 6, 1992, at 74
(discussing shortcomings in private charity as an answer to all social problems).
120. David Gergen, Renewing the Call to Service, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May
20, 1996, at 76 (reporting that "[President] Bush told his successor, Bill Clinton, that he
only had one request: the preservation and strengthening of Points of Light"). The
SELECTED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON THE POINTS OF LIGHT INITIATIVE.

Foundation intends to renew the program with some presidential involvement. It will not,
however, be a presidential program. Jennifer Moore, Points of Light Foundation to

Revive Daily Awards Program, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, June 27, 1996, at 15;
Jennifer Moore & Grant Williams, Clinton vs. Dole on Non-Profit Issues, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 8, 1996, at 45.
121. The Foundation made this quite clear when it launched a recruitment drive on
behalf of President Clinton's inaugural ceremonies. A Foundation spokesperson noted
that many of its board members supported President Clinton. Deborah Baldwin, The
Divorce Is Final, COMMON CAUSE MAG., Spring 1993, at 5.
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service initiative." President Clinton's 1997 proposed Budget seeks $6
million in funding for the Foundation, slightly more than approved by
Congress for fiscal year 1996.123 The Foundation works closely with the

Corporation for National Service. 24 Although a substantial amount of its
revenue comes from nongovernmental sources, the Foundation remains
dependent on congressional appropriations. Since 1993, it has received its
federal funding in the form of grants from the Corporation for National
Service. l 2s
2. The New American Schools Development Corporation

Soon after the creation of the Foundation, President Bush applied the
same emphasis on private initiative to his education policy. In 1991, the
"Education President"1 26 unveiled his comprehensive plan to revitalize the
education system in the United States, America 2000,127 which had as its
centerpiece the creation of the New American Schools Development
Corporation ("NASDC"). 2 President Bush characterized NASDC as a
122. See Bush's "Points of Light" Volunteerism Burns On, With Clinton's Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1993, at A22.
123. See President Seeks Increases in Many Programs That Support Charities,
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY,

Apr. 4, 1996, at 35.

124. For example, the Points of Light Foundation and the Corporation for National
Service organized a presidential summit on volunteerism to take place in February 1997.
PresidentialSummit to Spur Volunteerism, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, July 25, 1996,
at 14.
125. Some argue that the Points of Light Foundation is in a more precarious situation
with the Corporation for National Service than it was with the Commission. This is
because the President of the National Service Corporation is appointed by the President,
whereas the National Service Commission was bipartisan commission. In addition, many
members of Congress prefer the type of enabling work conducted by the Foundation over
that of the "stipended community service" furthered by the National Service Corporation.
See Volunteering Versus Stipended Community Service, 140 CONG. REc. S10527 (1994)
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
126. President Bush referred to himself as the "Education President" while
campaigning in 1987. See School Daze, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1988, at 16. See also
Frank Clifford, Conservatives Attack Bush, Dole in Lively N.H. Debate, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1988, at 1.
127. See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
1 PUB. PAPERS 129 (Jan. 31, 1990).
128. President Bush announced the creation of the New American Schools
Development Corporation at an address on education before invited members of Congress
and business leaders. He restated the six goals for American education that he announced
during his State of the Union address on January 31, 1990. Address to the Nation on the
National Education Strategy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 395 (Apr. 18, 1991) [hereinafter President
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private sector research and development fund that would, after
considerable study, apply its results to establish a new school in each of
the 535 congressional districts.' 29
The choice of form won praise from members of Congress and the

business community.' 30 As with the Points of Light Foundation, NASDC

is organized and operated as an independent corporation. It is exempt
from federal income tax under § 501(c)(3) and qualifies to receive taxdeductible contributions. 3 '
It is not organized as a government
corporation.' 32 Unlike the Foundation, NASDC's most recent Annual
Report does not mention President Bush. 133 In fact, some recent media
accounts fail to reference the role of the Bush administration in the
Bush Address on Education]. See also 137 CONG. REc. S60081 (1991) (statements of
Sen. Cochran) (referring to New American Schools Development Corporation as the
"centerpiece of the education reform strategy").
The following are the six goals of education reform: (i) every child starts school
ready to learn; (ii) raise high school graduation rate to 90%; (iii) ensure that students
leaving 4th, 8th and 12th grades demonstrate competence in core subjects; (iv) make
students first in world in math and science; (v) ensure that all adults are literate and have
skills to compete in global economy and exercise duties of citizenship; and (vi) liberate
schools from drugs and violence. See supra note 127, at 131.
129. The goals of NASDC are now considerably more modest. NASDC's program
is organized in three two-year phases to coincide with its anticipated six year life span.
Phase 1 lasted from 1992 to 1993 and involved defining concepts and strategy. Phase 2
extended until 1995 and field-tested 147 new school designs. Phase 3 is set to end in
1997, and it concludes with adopting new school designs in at least 30% of the schools
in 10 communities throughout the United States. See NEW AMERICAN SCHOOLS
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, A THOUSAND ACTIONS . . . . ANNUAL REPORT
1994/1995, at 9 [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
130. See 137 CONG. REc. S5451 (1991) (statement of Sen. Seymour) (remarking "It
is time for newer and more pragmatic approaches to restructure the way America
learns").
131. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
132. The government has no continuing control over the NASDC. The organization
is a "private, nonpartisan, nonprofit corporation." See ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 129,
at 7.
133. Its earlier Annual Report noted that NASDC had been "endorsed" by President
Bush and President Clinton. See NASDC, VISION TO REALITY, ANNUAL REPORT
1993/1994. Only much later in the text does it mention that NASDC was "[c]reated at
the behest of President George Bush and strongly endorsed by President Bill Clinton."
See ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 129, at 4.
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creation of NASDC and instead describe it as "a private non-profit group
formed by corporate leaders . . . ."
Bush estimated that NASDC would require somewhere between $150

million and $200 million in funding over its first five years of operation. 35
'
Consistent with his goal to fund necessary social services with nontax
revenue, Bush expected private industry to supply the majority of the
required funding. 3 6 Despite enthusiastic endorsements from many
industry leaders, the early fundraising efforts were disappointing.' 37 It was
not until the third year of operation that revenue exceeded expenses, and
this was the result of a large challenge grant from the Annenberg
Foundation-not a corporate donor.1 38 The uncertainty surrounding the
1992 presidential election and the change in administration made
fundraising particularly more difficult. 3 9 Apparently, corporate managers
perceived NASDC as a pet project of the Bush administration and were
reluctant to provide resources to NASDC without a clear pledge of support
from the newly-elected President Clinton.'4
Clinton specifically endorsed the activities of NASDC five months into
his presidency14' and incorporated much of the America 2000 plan into his
Goal 2000 education plan.142 The hesitancy on the part of funding sources
134. Mark Skertic, School Innovations Offer Hope, CIN. ENQUIRER, Nov. 1, 1995,
at B1. See also David T. Kearns, Business'Role in School Reform, CORP. BOARD, Nov.
1993, at 2 (quoting the former chairperson of the NASDC as stating that the organization
was "created by the business community"); William H. Miller, Test Beds for School
Improvement, INDUSTRY WK., Jan. 9, 1995, at 11 (referring to NASDC as a "nonprofit,
industry-sponsored group").
135. See 137 CONG. REC. S6008 (1991) (testimony of Sen. Cochran) (noting the
$200 million fundraising goal).
136. From a tax-expenditure standpoint, a portion of every corporate dollar
represents foregone federal income tax revenue. For a discussion of the after-tax costs
of charitable contributions see supra note 91.
137. See Miller, supranote 134, at 12 (quoting NASDC President John L. Anderson
as stating that attracting corporate contributions has been "a little tougher than we
anticipated").
138. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 129, at 33.
139. See Thomas Toch, A FamiliarRefrain for School Reform, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 31, 1993, at 70.
140. See id.
141. In an award ceremony on the White House lawn for Blue Ribbon Schools,
Clinton praised "public-spirited business leaders" and concluded his remarks with a
request for more funding for NASDC. See Remarks Honoring Blue Ribbon Schools, I
PUB. PAPERS 657 (May 14, 1995).
142. Anthony Flint, U.S. Education Secretary FavorsMeasuredApproach to School
Reform, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 18, 1991, at 25.
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pending this endorsement suggests that potential donors did not perceive
a GCCO, even one that is
43 not organized as a government corporation, to
be all that independent.
C. EntrepreneurialGovernment and National Service
Before taking office, president-elect Clinton announced that one of his
top five priorities would be to persuade Congress to institute some form
of national service. 44 This proposal drew immediate scorn from
conservative 4lawmakers
who were opposed to paying young people to
"volunteer."1 5 It seemed to promise more big government, more
bureaucracy, and more entitlements.
The Clinton administration attempted to address this criticism by

structuring the Corporation for National Service as the ultimate product of
a reinvented government-a public/charity partnership that would seek
private funding and work closely with state and local authorities. The
purpose statement of the Corporation for National Service (The
Corporation) explains that it will act like an "entrepreneurial nonprofit
corporation" and will actively seek private contributions.'" In his message
to Congress transmitting the National and Community Service Trust Act
of 1993,1 47 President Clinton described the Act as designed "to reduce
143. It is interesting then that contributions to the NASDC appear to have stalled
waiting for Clinton to give the project a nod. This suggests that the "goodwill" a
corporation seeks to "purchase" may involve more than the generic advertising value of
a corporate charitable contribution. Prospective donors wanted to make sure that they
were funding a government approved endeavor.
144. See Kristin A. Goss & Elizabeth Greene, National Service: A Boon for
Charities?,CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Dec. 15, 1992, at 1.
145. See 141 CONG. REc. E1890, (1995) (discussing an article by Representative
Molinari, titled Is Americorps Worth Keeping?, in which she contends that Americorps
"volunteers" who are paid salaries, receive medical benefits, and are entitled to
educational stipends, are not volunteers at all). See also Any Volunteers?, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 21, 1995, at 32 (discussing Speaker Gingrich's concern that national service is
"coerced voluntarism.").
146. In case there were any doubts about the importance of corporate contributions,
President Clinton issued an Executive Notice soliciting contributions of cash, goods and
services for the Corporation for National Service. Solicitation and Acceptance of
Donations, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,166 (1994).
147. See National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-1,
107 Stat. 785 (1993). [hereinafter Trust Act].
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waste and promote an entrepreneurial government culture." 4' 8 Despite this
innovative structure, it continues to be a lightning rod for the objections
of primarily Republican lawmakers. 49
The Corporation is a charitable government corporation. 5 0 Its purpose

is to provide young people with a meaningful opportunity for national
service and let them earn money toward their college educations. The
Corporation manages three different volunteer programs: Americorps,
Learn and Serve, and the National Senior Service Corps, often referred to
collectively as "Americorps."'' In the new spirit of "entrepreneurial
government," President Clinton assured Congress that "the Corporation
will operate
as much like a lean nonprofit corporation as a government
52
agency."1
The White House "Fact Sheet" for the Act clearly articulates the ideal
of the public/charity partnership-once again embodied in a GCCO. It
states, "[t]he Act is designed to build partnerships-among Federal
Government, State governments, and the private sector; and within
communities, among the schools, businesses, and civic organizations that
seek to fight common problems." 1 3 Because it is a government
corporation, the control is not left to business leaders. The members of
the Corporation's Board of Directors are appointed by the President and
148. Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation on National Service
and Student Loan Reform, 1 PUB. PAPERS 574 (May 5, 1993) (stating that the Acts
"reject wasteful bureaucracy-instead reinventing government to unleash the ideas and
initiative of the American people.").
149. See 141 CONG. REc. S975 (1995) (statement of Sen. Grassley). However,
many members do support the program. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. E128 (1996)
(statment of Rep. Vento citing a study quantifying the benefits produced by Americorps
volunteers).
150. The Corporation for National Service combined two existing independent
agencies, the Commission on National and Community Service and ACTION. See
Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation on National Service and
Student Loan Reform, supra note 148, at 575.
151. At the signing on the White House lawn, President Clinton announced that the
new National Service Plan would operate under the name "Americorps." Remarks on
Signing the National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1543,
1545 (Sept. 23, 1993). The Corporation for National Service actually encompass three
main programs: Americorps, Learn and Serve America, and the National Senior Service

Corps. Americorps itself includes two separate programs: Americorps VISTA and
Americorps National Civilian Community Corps.

152. Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation on National Service
and Student Loan Reform, supra note 148, at 575.
153. The White House, National Service Trust Act Fact Sheet (1993).
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confirmed by the Senate.' 54 In addition, seven Cabinet secretaries serve
as non-voting ex-officio members.' 55
The Corporation receives the bulk of its revenue from congressional
appropriations,' 56 but it is required by law to raise a stated percentage of

its revenue from nongovernmental sources. 157 In an attempt to attract

contributions, Clinton issued an Executive Notice requesting contributions
of cash, services, and goods.'5 8 This effort notwithstanding,
the receipts
59
from the private sector have been disappointing.1
The debate over the 1996 Federal Budget almost killed Americorps,
but an 11th hour compromise, curiously termed a "reinvention," saved the
program. 160 The compromise included increased funding for the Points of
Light Foundation and a requirement that a larger percentage of Americorps
revenue come from the private sector.161
IV. THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT CREATED
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
A GCCO results from a determination that a given program will
"work better on less money " 162 if its delivery system is located in the
charitable sector rather than the public or private sector. 163 Reinventing
154. See Trust Act, supra note 147.
155. See id.
156. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1, at 31 (discussing the importance of
seed money as an alternative delivery form); see also 141 CONG. REC. S18651 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Wellstone citing the importance of federal "seed support").
157. See Trust Act, supra note 147.
158. See Solicitation and Acceptance of Donations, supra note 146.
159. For a compilation of the contributions see Susan B. Garland, A Social Program
CEOs Want to Save, Bus. WK., June 19, 1995, at 120 (including donations from Nike,
BellSouth, American Express, Proctor & Gamble, General Electric, Texaco, Sony, and
another government corporation-Fannie Mae).
160. Earlier, President Clinton had vetoed the Rescissions Bill that would have
terminated the Corporation for National Service.
Message to the House of
Representatives Returning Without Approval Legislation for Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations and Recissions for Fiscal Year 1995, 1 PUB. PAPERS 828 (June 7, 1995).
161. See 141 CONG. REc. S13329 (testimony of Sen. Grassley).
162. See Remarks Announcing the National Performance Review, supranote 41, at
235.
163. Osborne and Gaebler identify the charitable or "third" sector as separate and
distinct from either the public or the private sector. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra
note 1, at 43-44. However, they describe the third sector in a way that is not coextensive
with the term charitable sector as used in this Article. Osborne and Gaebler define the
third sector as "made up of organizations that are privately owned and controlled, but that
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government ascribes certain strengths and weaknesses to each of the three

sectors. 164 It does not presume that government will automatically assume

responsibility for a desired social or economic program.' 65 Neither does
it presume that all such matters should be left to the nongovernmental
sectors166 In this way, reinvention attempts to chart a middle course
between the notion of a big federal government associated with New Deal
liberalism and that of no federal government associated with the New
Federalism of the Reagan revolution. 67
Evaluating alternative forms of service delivery recognizes the
importance of institutional choice. 168 Some programs are better suited to
the public sector, whereas others are more appropriate for the private or
charitable sectors. This begins the process of deciding among what Neil
exist to meet public or social needs, not to accumulate private wealth." Id. at 44. It is
unclear how their view of "private wealth" fits with the general prohibition against private
inurement applicable to charitable organizations.
164. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1, at 43 (describing the differences
among the three sectors: the private sector, the public sector, and the third sector).
Within each sector there continues to be a wide range of possible configurations.
Osborne and Gaebler present 36 different alternatives to "standard service delivery by
public employees" including the use of seed money, impact fees, and franchising. Id. at
31.
165. Phase II of the National Performance Review was titled "Cutting Back to
Basics." One of its major goals was to move "the service delivery capability to the most
effective provider." PRIVATIZATION REPORT, supra note 59, at 1. It listed five basic
ways to accomplish this goal, including: service termination, privatization, quasigovernment corporations, creation of public/private partnerships, and competition or
"outsourcing." Id. at 1-2.
166. Osborne and Gaebler state that privatization is not the answer, it is one answer.
See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1, at 45. See generally id. at 45-47 (explaining
that reinventing government is not "some grand ideology of privatizing government").
The National Performance Review privatization report includes the following quote from
the GSA Deputy Administrator, Julia Stasch: "This is not a privatization exercise ....
This is a most cost-effective alternative exercise. It would be irresponsible to do
privatization for the sake of privatization. Privatization itself is not the goal. It's only
a tool." PRIVATIZATION REPORT, supra note 58, at 9.
167. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1, at 321-25 (describing the need for a
paradigm shift to replace the image of big government formed under the New Deal
paradigm).
168. Weisbrod observed an increased interest in charitable organizations in
connection with attempts to fashion more efficient enterprises. See BURTON A.
WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 5 (1988) (explaining that "[e]very society makes
choices about what forms of institutions it will rely on to achieve its socioeconomic goals"
and citing the work of economists Lance E. Davis and Douglas C. North).

1997]

REINVENTING GOVERNMENT

Komesar terms "imperfect alternatives. " 169 The analysis requires three
elements: a goal, the relevant alternative institutions, and a guiding
measure by which to determine the relative merits of the alternative
institutions. 1 ' In the case of reinventing government, goal identification
entails the recognition that "there is a definite public need for a service at
the federal level,"' 7 ' such as encouraging voluntarism,172 revolutionizing74
educational policy, 73 or providing a stipend for charity volunteers.
Once the goal is identified, 75 a decision must be made whether to locate
the delivery of the service (and its funding) in the public, charitable, or
private sector. 176 The measure used to determine the best placement for
169. KOMESAR, supra note 21, at 5 (stating "[t]he choice is always a choice among
highly imperfect alternatives").
170. See id.
171. PRIVATIZATION REPORT, supra note 58, at 2 (explaining the utility of the
"quasi-government" corporation). The report emphasizes the business or commercial
aspects of government corporations. It explains the type of service provided as follows:
Generally it is a service that can readily be provided by the private sector, but
there is no commercial service market able or willing to take on the
responsibility. In effect, instead of providing the service directly as a public
(in-house) good, the government opts to create a corporation and a market
where there is none today.
Id. S~e also 1995 GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 6 (discussing the business or
commercial character of government corporations).
172. The Points of Light Foundation is a GCCO. Its charitable purpose is to
encourage individual volunteer efforts. See supra notes 111-25 and accompanying text
(describing the formation of the Points of Light Foundation).
173. NASDC is a GCCO. Its charitable purpose is to revolutionize primary and
secondary education in anticipation of the Twenty-First Century. See supra text
accompanying notes 126-43 (describing the formation of the NASDC).
174. The Corporation for National Service is a GCCO that is also organized as a
government corporation. Its charitable purpose is to coordinate the activities of various
national service initiatives, including Americorps. See supra notes 144-61 and
accompanying text (describing the formation of the Corporation for National Service).
175. This article looks at the question of institutional choice after the government
reaches a decision that a specific program is desirable. The term government can mean
the executive, Congress, voters, or the bureaucracy. Accordingly, this article does not
address the many questions that could be raised concerning how the initial decision is
reached or whether it represents consensus.
176. The charitable sector is correctly identified as possessing characteristics
different from either the public or private sectors and, therefore, warrants separate
consideration. The number of alternative institutions will vary depending upon the goal.
See KOMEsAR, supra note 21, at 9 (noting "no magic" about the categories used: the
market, the courts, and the legislature).
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the program is where it will "work better" (i.e., be most efficient) and
"cost less" (i.e., attract nontax revenue).
This type of comparative institutional analysis has been advocated by
recent law and economics scholarship' 77 and by what has been termed the
"new legal process" movement. 7' However, the comparative institutional
analysis offered by reinventing government is driven by political and fiscal
exigencies, namely the desire to provide social services without increasing
federal spending. 1 9 The resulting emphasis on immediate access to nontax
revenue inhibits
the ability of this
to factortoinconsider
measuresin of
justice
or participation8
that analysis
are appropriate
thesocial
case
of governmental action. On a more basic level, the analysis focuses on
short-term gains and does not take into account the potential costs of the
effect of GCCOs on corporations and the charitable community.
This section identifies some of these potential costs, including (i) the
increased burden placed on certain corporations to provide funding for
social services through nontax, albeit tax-subsidized, dollars;" 2 (ii) the
corresponding invitation for corporate donors to influence the development
and implementation of social policy; 13 (iii) the introduction of the federal
government as a competitor for charitable contributions;" and (iv) the
resulting de facto creation of a preferred class of charitable
177. See generally KOMESAR, supra note 21.
178. Edward Rubin suggests a synthesis of the law and economics interest in the

relative efficiency of various institutional forms with the primacy of institutions in postcritical outsider jurisprudence. See Rubin, supranote 21, at 1411 (noting "the possibility
of a new synthesis in the discourse of legal scholarship"). He proposes that a
"microanalysis" of institutions could find common ground between seemingly disparate
law and economics and the different forms of outsider jurisprudence, such as critical race
theory, feminist jurisprudence, and lesbian and gay legal theory. See id. at 1425
(describing "the new unified methodology" as the "microanalysis" of institutions).
179. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1, at 322 (explaining that state and local
governments "had little choice: they had to grapple with the tax revolt, the sad state of
public education, the runaway costs of prisons and Medicaid").
180. See Rubin, supra note 21, at 1429 (suggesting that the appropriate measure is

a balance between efficiency and social justice).
181. See KOMESAR, supranote 21, at 67-81 (describing a model designed to measure
a "participation-centered approach" balancing between minoritarian and majoritarian
influence).
182. See infra text accompanying notes 191-202.
183. See infra text accompanying notes 203-21.
184. See infra text accompanying notes 224-34.
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organizations.'8 5 It also offers a public choice analysis of corporate
support of GCCOs.' 86
A. The Effect on Corporations
Although a GCCO typically receives start-up or seed money from
Congress,"8 7 it is designed to maximize revenue from nongovernmental
sources.1 88 This emphasis on nongovernmental funding, combined with
continued government control or input, gives the federal government a
direct interest in charitable giving. 189 The federal government is
transformed into a charitable fundraiser.' 90
Instead of exercising its
coercive taxing power, it must persuade corporations to contribute to
GCCOs. This section asks why corporations fund GCCOs and what they

receive in return.
1. The Burden: A Selective Assessment
When the federal government inaugurates a new education program,
the bulk of the funding is derived from the individual and corporate
income taxes' 9 1-an exercise of the state's power to reallocate private
185. See infra text accompanying notes 235-43.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 244-65.
187. See supratext accompanying notes 75-79.
188. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
189. This differs from the ERTA tax incentives which sought to encourage voluntary
contributions to fund the activities of a diverse and broadly-defined group of qualified
organizations. Arguably, the federal government has always had an indirect interest in
charitable giving to the extent that the activities of charitable organizations "lessen the
burdens of government." See Knauer, supra note 6, at 995-99.
190. See, e.g., Solicitation and Acceptance of Donations, supra note 146. This
portion of the funding is not the result of the exercise of the government's taxing power,
but it is aided by certain tax incentives designed to reduce the after-tax cost of charitable
giving. For a discussion of tax expenditures see supra note 86. For a discussion of the
effect of the charitable contribution deduction on the after-tax cost of giving see HALL,
supranote 47.
191. Income taxes account for approximately 55% of all federal revenue. This is
followed closely by payroll taxes that account for almost 40% of total revenue. Payroll
taxes, however, are generally earmarked for specific purposes such as the various Social
Security insurance funds and hospital insurance for the senior citizens. Accordingly,
general spending needs are satisfied principally by income tax receipts.
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resources for public applications. 192 Taxpayers theoretically shoulder an
equitable share of the cost of the program because income tax liability is
calculated by reference to a taxpayer's relative ability to pay measured by
the tax base.' 93 This is not the case with NASDC, where corporate donors
appear to pay "voluntarily"
a disproportionate share of the cost of that
94
social program. 1
Contemporary views of corporate giving describe it as "enlightened
self-interest." 195 Under this view, a corporate transfer to charity is more
in the nature of a quid pro quo transaction than a gift flowing from
"detached and disinterested generosity."' 96
In exchange for the
contribution payment, the corporation receives advertising value and
favorable public relations when it associates its name or products with a
192. Although the income tax system is one of voluntary assessment, there is nothing
voluntary about tax liability. Graetz and Schenk describe taxation as "the process by
which a government transfers resources (almost always money) from the private to the
public sector." MICHAEL J. GRAETZ AND DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES I (3d ed. 1995).
193. A fundamental feature of the income tax system is that tax liability is a function
of a taxpayer's "ability to pay" measured by reference to the taxpayer's taxable income,
Thus, similarly situated taxpayers should bear the same burden of taxation. This is
difficult to apply to the corporate income tax because the burden of the tax is ultimately
borne by individuals (e.g., consumers, shareholders, employees). For a discussion of
how the corporate income tax is based on a strong entity theory of the corporation see
Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of Corporate
Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 835 (1997).
194. Of course, reasonable persons could question whether a contribution is truly
voluntary when it is prompted by a telephone call from the President or other highranking government officials. For a discussion of the voluntary nature of contributions
to GCCOs see infra text accompanying notes 260-65. The contribution payments are taxdeductible, whereas the campaign contributions are not. See I.R.C. § 160(e) (1986).
195. The term "enlightened self-interest" is widely used by fundraisers and corporate
managers to describe how a corporate donor balances philanthropic pursuits with the
obligation to maximize shareholder profit and gain. For a discussion of the origin of the
term see Knauer, supra note 19, at 27 n.149 (explaining that the term first appeared in
testimony during the landmark charitable giving case ofA.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow,
98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953)).
196. The Duberstein standard of "detached and disinterested generosity" defines a
gift for federal income tax purposes of the federal income tax. See Commissioner v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284-85 (1960) (construing the meaning of "gift" for purposes
of the exclusion of gifts from gross income). There has been some debate as to whether
this standard also applies to the term "gift or contribution" when used in connection with
the charitable contribution deduction. See Knauer, supra note 19, at 35-41 (comparing
the subjective standard of Duberstein to the quid pro quo analysis of Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989)).

1997]

REINVENTING GOVERNMENT

charitable cause.' 97 This is referred to in the marketing industry as the
"halo effect." 9 8 Thus, it is not appropriate to ask whether corporations
"voluntarily" make detached and disinterested gifts to GCCOs. Most
corporate giving does not meet that standard. Instead, the question should
be whether corporations voluntarily choose to enter into marketing
relationships with GCCOs or whether they are subject to some form of
pressure or coercion from government officials.
When a corporation sponsors Breast Cancer Awareness Week, it bears
a disproportionate share of the cost of the public good of disseminating
educational information regarding early detection and treatment of breast
cancer. The public good, however, is provided privately and without the
determination of a "definite public need for a service at the federal
level." " Indeed, the private provision of certain collective goods which
are undersupplied by the government explains a major point of the
government failure theory of charitable organization formation.'
With
a GCCO, the contribution payment is a direct substitute for tax dollars
because it is paying for a service that the government determined should
be provided at the federal level. 20' The contribution payment represents
the government's attempt to fund the service with nontax revenue. If the
government also applies some form of pressure on corporations to
contribute, then it is using its persuasive/coercive power to reallocate
197. The following section describes the potential benefits attached to contribution
payments to GCCOs. See infra text accompanying notes 203-21. Commentators
routinely categorize corporate giving expenditures by reference to the underlying business
or self-interested motivation for the transfer. See, e.g., Knauer, supra note 19, at 60-88
(categorizing corporate contributions as advertising, goodwill and public relations, and
investment in future markets and future employees); Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate
Contributions to Charity: Nothing More Than a Marketing Strategy?in PHILANTHROPIC
GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS 246-52 (Richard Magat ed., 1989)
(describing corporate giving as marketing, public relations, enlightened self-interest, tax
strategy, and 'social currency').
198. The marketing industry refers to the goodwill a corporation can gain by
associating its name or products with a charitable organization as the "halo effect." See

Knauer, supra note 19, at 57-60 (discussing the nature of the "halo effect").
199. PRIVATIZATION REPORT, supranote 58, at 2. The National Performance Review
refers to providing a collective good privately as doing so "in-house." Id.
200. For a discussion of the government failure theory see infra text accompanying
notes 274-82.
201. See PRIVATIZATION REPORT, supra note 58, at 2 (quoting the National
Performance Review).
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private wealth to public applications on a highly selective basis. This
selective assessment violates a basic tenet of tax policy-equity." 2
2. The Benefit: An Invitation to Influence Public Policy
Despite the argument that solicited contributions represent a
disproportionate corporate assessment, there has been no outcry from the
corporate community regarding GCCOs. 2 3 To the contrary, business
leaders provide enthusiastic support for NASDC and the Corporation for
National Service 204 and seem to welcome the opportunity to shape social
policy. 20 5 During the 1995 budget controversy surrounding continued
funding for the Corporation for National Service,2 6 business leaders
lobbied Congress in support of the National Service Program.20 7 This
208
support was cited again and again by the advocates of national service.
202. In the alternative, it is possible that corporations contribute to GCCOs because
GCCOs simply offer a more attractive "halo effect." See supra note 198 and
accompanying text.
203. Some corporate representatives, however, have expressed concern that the
federal government expects too much from the corporate community. For example, an
IBM representative said that it was "totally unrealistic" to expect business to pay the
entire bill for national service. Jennifer Moore & Amanda Rocque, National Service's
Uncertain Future, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Apr. 20, 1995, at 1, 14 (quoting the
president of the IBM International Foundation). IBM contributed $120,000 to the
Corporation for National Service to set up computer networks and repair old ones. Id.
In fact, the private contributions have not been as high as the government had hoped with
regard to any of the public/charity initiatives. For example, the Points of Light
Foundation now raises over one-third of its revenue from nongovernment sources, but it
still receives 65% of its revenue from the federal government. See 1995 GAO REPORT,
supra note 56. Thus, it has not achieved its initial goal of financial independence. See
supra note 117.
204. See 141 CONG. REc. S18639 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone) (citing support by "businesses such as IBM, General Electric, and American
Express").
205. Barbara Benham, Business EmbracesIts New Role in Education, INVESTOR'S
DAILY, Apr. 23, 1991, at 1; William H. Miller, Bush Bucks It to Business, INDUSTRY
WK., May 20, 1991, at 70.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 160-61 (describing the controversy).
207. See Susan B. Garland & Mary Beth Reagan, A Social Program CEOs Want to
Save, Bus. WK., June 19, 1995, at 120 (citing that the appeal of Americorps is that it
"tries to operate like a business."). See also Plugged Ears in Congress; Business Likes
Americorps; So Why Are Pro-business Lawmakers Opposed?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22,
1995, at B8 (noting "participation and support of large corporate donors, including
American Express, Anheuser-Bush, General Electric, IBM, Microsoft, and Nike.").
208. See supra note 147.
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In essence, the business leaders registered their support for the program
through their contributions.
Contribution payments to GCCOs have the potential to yield benefits
well beyond those associated with corporate giving generally. When the
federal government asks private corporations to contribute to the Points of
Light Foundation, 2 9 NASDC,2 10 or the National Service Corporation, 211 it
lets them choose the social programs they want to fund.
Moreover, the
request for funding is an invitation to influence policy. 213 President Bush
was quite clear on this point when raising funds for NASDC. In his
Address on Education, Bush said,
[t]here's a special place in inventing the New American School
for the corporate community, for business and labor. And I invite
you to work with us not simply to transform our schools but to
transform every American adult into a student . . .. The
corporate community can take the lead by creating a voluntary
private system of world class standards for the workplace. 1 4
This invitation to help shape social policy extends beyond'simple
input
•
215
and, in certain circumstances, can translate into considerable control.
Representatives of large corporate donors often serve on the board of
directors or other governing body of a GCCO. Because a GCCO is
responsible for the development and implementation of federal policy, a
seat on the governing body enables corporate donors to influence social
209. See supra text accompanying notes 111-25.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 126-43.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 144-61.
212. Thus, the "selective or voluntary assessment" is earmarked for specific
purposes unlike ordinary tax dollars.
213. For a discussion of the budget dispute concerning Americorps see supra text
accompanying notes 160-61. The monetary support of corporate donors is seen as
corporate endorsement of the project.
214. See PresidentBush Address on Education, supra note 128.
215. This is not the case with a GCCO organized as a government corporation where
certain members of the Board of Directors or other governing body may serve ex officio.
See PRIVATIZATION REPORT supra note 58 (discussing various forms of continuing
government control over government corporations). The fact that the President appoints

the head of the Corporation for National Service insures continued control over the
management of the organization.
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policy directly.2" 6 In the case of NASDC, President Bush assembled an
impressive array of business leaders, referred to as the "Business Core
Group," to coordinate its efforts.217 This group included the chairs of
IBM, Xerox, R.J. Reynolds, the American Stock Exchange, and Eastman
Kodak. 218
The level of corporate involvement gives rise to two related concerns
that reflect the dual nature of GCCOs. First, GCCOs that rely heavily on

corporate contributions may become too accountable to corporate

interests, 219 thereby compromising the charitable mission of the GCCO.
This is similar to the concern regarding the influence that corporate giving
220
has generally on the charitable mission of the donee organizations.
Here, the concern is slightly different because any potential influence
relates not to the activities of a single private charity, but to the
development and implementation of far-reaching federal social policy.
Secondly, the continuing government involvement could scare away certain

corporate contributors if potential contributors view a GCCO as too
216. See Garland & Reagan, supra note 207, at 120 (quoting the former head of
Americorps, Eli J. Segal, referring to the requirement that the nongovernment sources
provide at least 25% of the operational costs. "This translates to the kind of business
buy-in that other federal programs have not had.").
217. President Bush assembled an impressive array of business leaders: Paul O'Neill
(president and CEO of Alcoa, chair of Bush's Education Policy Advisory Council, and
chair of NASDC), John F. Akers (chair of IBM), Norman Augustine (Martin-Marietta),
David Kearns (chair of Xerox), James Baker (chair and CEO of Arvin Industries), Louis
Gerstner (chair of R.J.R. Nabisco), James Herr (chair of Herr Foods) James Jones (chair
of American Stock Exchange), James Ketesen (chair of Tenneco), Frank Shrontz (chair
of Boeing), and Kay Whittemore (chair of Eastman Kodak). See Benham, supra note
205.
218. The Business Core Group addressed four general areas: experimental schools,
greater accountability by schools, adult education, and community involvement. In
addition, the Business Core Group was asked to develop achievement tests and curriculum
standards articulating skills needed by future employees and job-related skill standards for
industries. See Miller, supranote 205, at 70.
219. See John T. Whiting, The New American Schools Development Corporation:
DidIt Create a ClimateforRealRefonn?, 74 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 777 (1993) (suggesting
that NASDC is too accountable to business and political interests to be an effective source
of radical reform).
220. See generally Holly Hall, Joint Ventures with Business: A SourDeal?, CHRON.
OF PHILANTHROPY, Apr. 6, 1993, at 21 (explaining the reluctance of certain charitable
organizations to associate with corporations linked to unpopular issues such as tobacco
or alcohol).
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political or the pet project of a specific administration or political party. 221
B. Increased Competition Within the CharitableCommunity
Researchers estimate that there are approximately 600,000
organizations described under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3), 222 all but
a handful of which are eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions.2
Against this backdrop, the addition of a few GCCOs should not upset the
balance. However, these new additions benefit from considerable media
attention and have a voracious appetite for fundraising.
The media fanfare associated with the new GCCOs could lead to
increased public awareness concerning charitable needs which, in turn,
could increase the level of charitable giving. It could also divert charitable
dollars from private charitable organizations. The end result could be the
de facto creation of a preferred class of government-sponsored charities
that offer prospective donors the opportunity to influence" social policy,
secure favorable public relations, and please government officials.2 4
1. The Static and Scarce Charitable Dollar.
Over the last ten years corporate giving has remained relatively
constant, with giving estimates for 1995 showing a modest gain over
1994.' In a zero sum world of corporate giving, GCCOs with ambitious
221. See, e.g., Editorial, Same Poolfor Experimental Schools?, N.Y. TIMES, July
18, 1991, at A20 [hereinafter Editorial] (suggesting contributions could be made as a
"political calculation").
222. As of 1994, the Internal Revenue Service reported that 599,745 organizations
were registered under § 501 (c)(3). See Tac-exempt OrganizationRegistered with the IRS,
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, July 13, 1995, at 44. Some researchers believe the actual
number is closer to 750,000. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL., THE CHARITABLE
NONPROFITS: AN ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS AND CHARACTERISTICS

4-5

(1994). The reason for the difference is undercounting due to rules that exempt certain
small organizations from applying to the IRS for recognition of exemption. Such
organizations are not required to file annual information returns. Id. at 4.
223. All § 501(c)(3) organizations, with the exception of public safety organizations,
qualify to receive tax-deductible contributions under § 170(c)(2). See I.R.C. §§
501(c)(3), 170(c)(2) (1994).
224. For a discussion of the benefits associated with contributions to GCCOs see
supra text accompanying notes 203-21.
225. Each year GIVING USA is published by the American Association of FundRaising Counsel Trust for Philanthropy. It is widely-cited as the authoritative source on
statistics for charitable giving. The report for each calendar year is published the
following summer. At the time of publication, many corporate donors have not even filed
their income tax returns for the period covered by the report. Accordingly, GIVING USA
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fund-raising goals have the potential to divert dollars from other private
charities.'

For example, Bush estimated that NASDC would require

between $150 million and $200 million in corporate contributions. 2 7 This

estimate appears small in relation to other social welfare spending items
in the federal budget," 8 or even the estimated $7.4 billion in annual
corporate contributions.229 However, the perspective changes considerably
when this goal is measured against the $400 million corporations give to
bases its initial estimate on surveys of major charities, corporations, and foundations.
Often, the edition of GIVING USA for the next year has to revise the earlier year's
estimates substantially, after taking into account income tax return data. See John
Murawski, A Banner Yearfor Giving, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, May 30, 1996, at 30
(explaining the likelihood of revisions). The following are the statistics for corporate
giving as reported in GIVING USA 1996 in current dollars and constant dollars. As
explained above, the figures for the last several years are subject to revision.
(in billions)
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

Current $
4.63
5.03
5.21
5.34
5.46
5.46

Constant $
7.09
7.32
7.31
7.13
6.91
6.57

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

Current $
5.62
5.92
6.26
6.88
7.40

Constant$
6.44
6.49
6.62
7.08
7.40

GIVING USA 1996, supra note 19, at 88.
226. See supranotes 209-18 and accompanying text (discussing the concern GCCOs
could have on donative patterns).
227. See Rochelle L. Stanfield, School Business, 20 NAT'L J., 1862, 1862 (1991)
(discussing the role of business leaders in an effort to improve the nation's education
system).
228. The following are some examples of proposed spending for social and cultural
services for fiscal year ended 1997, compared with estimated spending for 1996.
1996 spending
National Endowment for the Arts $131,000,000
Smithsonian Institution
308,000,000
Homeless Assistance Fund
823,000,000
AIDS prevention/treatment
787,000,000
Peace Corps
218,000,000
Foster care and adoption
4,322,000,000

1997 proposed
$136,000,000
329,000,000
1,120,000,000
830,000,000
225,000,000
4,445,000,000

See President Seeks Increases in Many Programs That Support Charities, CHRON.

OF

PHILANTHROPY, Apr. 4, 1996, at 35.
229. The estimate for corporate giving in 1995 is $7.4 billion. Until the IRS
releases tax return information, however, this figure is subject to revision. See GIVING
USA 1996, supra note 19, at 89.
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primary and secondary education each year. 230 Over a five year period,
NASDC, a start-up corporation, would need to secure up to one-tenth of
all corporate giving to primary and secondary education. Thus, the
entrance of a GCCO could drastically skew corporate contributions away
from local education initiatives such as "adopt a school" programs 23 ' and
"redirect corporate dollars that now pay for other education
experiments."1 32 Not only have many organizations lost federal funding,
but now they have gained a formidable competitor for the scarce charitable
dollar.3 3
Further, a continued government presence might induce some
corporations to forego contributions to education entirely. This way a
corporate manager can decline to fund NASDC on the basis that education
is outside the corporation's area of philanthropic interest."
The
alternatives are to risk becoming involved in something that is perceived
as too political or to refuse to contribute and possibly alienate the current
administration. One solution might be simply to stay out of education.
2. The Emergence of a "Preferred Class" of Charitable Organizations
If GCCOs and private charities are vying for the same corporate
dollar, then there are a variety of reasons that GCCOs may have a
competitive advantage.3 5 A contribution to a GCCO offers media
attention, the chance to curry favor with government officials, and,
perhaps most importantly, the opportunity to influence federal policy. 36
The combination of these factors may make corporate donors more likely
230. In 1990, U.S. corporations contributed $400 million in cash and equipment to
primary and secondary education. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF FUND-RAISING COUNSEL,
1991 GIVING USA: THE ANUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1990, at 90
(1991) [hereinafter 1991 GIVING USA].
231. See generally Stanfield, supra note 227 (citing concerns voiced by business
representatives and educators).
232. See, e.g., Editorial, supranote 221, at A20 (expressing concern that NASDC

may redirect corporate dollars away from other experiments).
233. The effect of this competition is magnified because while the federal
government is competing with private charities for funding, it is simultaneously reducing
its funding of social welfare programs. See Salamon, supra note 48.
234. See Stanfield, supra note 227, at 65 (citing the concerns of then-President of
Columbia University Teachers College that corporate donors might avoid public education

as a giving concern if they are going to have their "arm twisted from the White House").
235. See 141 CONG. REC. S.18651 (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (reporting that
Americorps raised $41 million from the private sector in its first year).
236. Further, a corporate manager might be unwilling to just say "no" to a
solicitation from the President, member of Congress, or other government official.
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to fund the Corporation for National Service over other wholly-private
local job training programs." 3 The result could be the de facto creation
of a new class of "preferred" or "government-sponsored" charitable
organizations.23 8
The continuing government involvement with a GCCO 239 insures the
GCCO and its contributors that they will have sustained media coverage,
at least during the start-up phase. To the extent corporate contributions
substitute for advertising and public relations expenditures,2 40 guaranteed
national exposure makes a contribution to a GCCO more attractive than a
contribution to a local charity or even an established national charity. 24'
In addition to the generic "halo effect," which accompanies any corporate
charitable contribution, a transfer to a GCCO has an added element of
patriotism-corporations doing their fair share.242
The national exposure and access to government officials and policy
making are not available in the case of contributions to private charities.
In terms of the quid pro quo reasoning, GCCOs simply have more to
offer. Thus, a corporate manager who wishes to maximize the impact of
the corporation's charitable dollars, and who is not adverse to politics,
would choose a GCCO over an ordinary charitable organization.
Given these advantages, GCCOs could easily dominate an area of
charitable giving to the detriment of local or even national private
initiatives that do not benefit from the same level of media exposure. This
237. See Whiting, supra note 219.
238. To some extent, charitable organizations already have government approval in
the form of preferred tax status. See JERALD SCHIFF, CHARITABLE GIVING AND
GOVERNMENT POLICY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 5 (1990); Salamon, supra note 48, at
102 (reporting that tax deductibility provides an additional $8.4 billion to all voluntary
organizations).
239. This would include activities of the government undertaken to reinforce the
prominence of a GCCO, such as the Presidential program recognizing individual "points
of light." See supra note 111.
240. See Galaskiewicz, supra note 197, at 247 (reporting that three studies show a
relationship between "advertising and contribution expenditures"); MICHAEL USEEM, THE
INNER CIRCLE: LARGE CORPORATIONS AND THE RISE OF BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVITY
IN THE U.S. AND U.K. 125-26 (1984) (describing the relationship between marketing and
charitable giving).
241. A representative of Timberland Company noted this potential: "As the program
gets bigger our investment goes further." See Garland and Reagan, supra note 207, at
120 (quoting Ken Freitas, vice-president for community enterprise).
242. The notion that corporations have a duty to be "socially responsible" was
voiced by many members of Congress during the discussion of the proposed ERTA tax
incentives for corporate giving. See Knauer, supra note 19, at 28, n. 156. (discussing the
use of social responsibility rhetoric during the debates over increased tax incentives for
corporation charitable contributions).
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threatens to undermine a long-standing political justification for charitable
organizations, namely that they further pluralism and diversity.243
C. A Public Choice or Interest Group Theory Perspective
It is instructive to view GCCOs through the lens of the public choice
or interest group theory of legislation. 244 The importance of this analysis
is not so much in what it proves. It is offered rather to identify the
potential for abuse by individuals operating at the extreme of human
behavior. 245 The following looks at two models of the legislators who
continue to support the funding of GCCOs. The comparative analysis of
reinventing government is driven by pragmatic budgetary concerns.
However, the laudable goal of protecting the federal fisc also can obscure
the potential for self-interested gain.
1. Public Choice Theory
Interest group theory starts with the premise that political actors
behave in the same self-interested manner as do economic actors. 246 Self243. For a discussion of the pluralism justification for favorable policy treatment of
charitable organizations see Knauer, supra note 6, at 995 (describing the notion that

charitable organizations further pluralism and are a distinct part of "national heritage").
244. Public choice theory is "the economic study of nonmarket decision making or
simply the application of economics to political science." See DENNIS C. MUELLER,
PUBLIC CHOICE 111 (1989).
245. A consistent critique of public choice theory is that it misapprehends the nature
of human motivation: rather than steely, self-interested wealth maximizers, individuals act
based on a variety of motives, some self-interested and some other-regarding. See Mark

Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing:A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical"
Practiceof the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988). The recognition
that self-interest cannot be the "sole" motivation for human action is voiced by public
choice scholars as well as their critics. See, e.g., Michael E. DeBow and Dwight R.

Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding)Public Choice: A Response to Farberand
Frickey, 66 TEx. L. REV. 993, 995-96 (1988) (describing the differences between the
"Chicago school" and the "Virginia school" of public choice).
246. See ROBERT E. MCCORMICK AND ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS,
LEGISLATION AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF
GOVERNMENT 5 (1981) (rejecting the notion that an elected official's behavior in the
political arena is public-interested rather than self-interested). See generally WILLIAM A.
NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971) (applying
public choice theory to a bureaucrat's behavior). See generally MUELLER, supranote 244,
at 348 (discussing the behavior of voters).
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interested politicians seek to further their chances of reelection.247
"Rent-seeking" interest groups capitalize on this desire and secure
arguably disproportionate economic or political power through protective
legislation or regulation.248 Interest groups purchase these rents from

reelection-maximizing politicians in exchange for campaign contributions,
endorsements, bribes, and lucrative post-government employment
opportunities.'
Public choice theory often sees privatization and deregulation as a
solution to the "problem" of government sanctioned "rents."2 0 For
example, it has been proposed that the privatization of all government
owned lands and mineral rights would solve the problem of government
created "rents. "251 As discussed above, a GCCO does not represent
privatization. 52 To the contrary, a GCCO envisions a continuing
government involvement which can range from ultimate ownership and
control to endorsements and fundraising efforts. It is exactly this
continued government participation that presents the opportunities for rentseeking.
2. Rent-seeking Corporations
It is possible to view the ability to influence social policy as a "rent"
derived from government in exchange for contributions payments to a
GCCO.3
NASDC provides a provocative example. The corporate
247. See Shaviro, supranote 38, at 83 (explaining that although politicians may have
goals in addition to reelection, reelection remains the essential ingredient for the
continuation of a political career).
248. "Rents" refer to monopoly rents created by lost consumer surplus resulting
from government intervention. See MUELLER, supranote 244, at 229-30. The monopoly
rents should not occur in a competitive market in the absence of government intervention.
Thus, the rents are secured through government action (or inaction) in the form of
legislation or other regulation.
249. The process of securing these government sanctioned rents is known as "rentseeking" which can be socially wasteful from a cost-benefit standpoint. See DANIEL A.
FARBER AND PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
35 (1991) (noting that "rent-seeking" is the attempt to generate returns in excess of
marginal production costs). For a discussion of the value politicians receive in exchange
for rents see Knauer, supra note 6, at 1045-49.

250. See MUELLER, supra note 244, at 245 (discussing needed reforms suggested by
public choice analysis).
251. See id. (citing a proposal by Hill and Anderson that the government auction off
public lands and mineral rights).
252. See supra note 58.
253. See MUELLER, supra note 244, at 229-30.
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interest in primary and secondary education preceded the establishment of
NASDC. 25 4 A former chair of NASDC, also the former CEO of Xerox,
explained that the public schools supply business's "most valuable
resource "-workers.' Business evidently finds the current supply lacking
in certain fundamental areas because each year U.S. business spends $25
billion in remedial education and training for employees. 6
The failure of the public school system is hardest felt by the high tech
and financial industries. 2 7 Such enterprises comprise an interest group
with a particularized need to revitalize the public schools in order to
educate future workers and consumers. NASDC represents a unique
opportunity for this interest group to tailor an educational policy that meets
the needs of industry. In exchange for this power, business is willing to
pay in the form of contributions. Other interest groups, such as the
National Education Association might welcome the opportunity to shape
national education policy. However, the opportunity comes with a hefty
price tag. In this way, the creation of a GCCO can represent a sale of the
power to set national policy to the highest bidder.
If the only visible exchange of value is the contribution payment to the
GCCO, it is difficult to see what benefit the reelection-maximizing
politician receives from the exchange. 8 As explained below, the
politician gets to claim credit for the GCCO administered program and is
not faced with difficult choices in securing funding for it."
Thus, the
politician benefits, albeit indirectly. Business benefits from this form of
exchange because, unlike political campaign contributions, the contribution
254. In 1990, U.S. corporations contributed $400 million in cash and equipment to
improve schools and combat illiteracy. See 1991 GIVING USA, supra note 230, at 90.
255. See Kearns, supra note 134, at 1 (drawing an analogy between the education
system and a corporate supplier that provided outmoded products).

256. See Benham, supranote 205 (citing contributions of $250 million for remedial
training).
257. See, e.g., Stanfield, supranote 227, at 1863 (describing the remedial employee
efforts of Motorola).
258.
In addition to ideological appeal and advertising currency,
the reallocation presents legislators with a golden
management opportunity. If we assume that legislators
desire reelection, or, at a minimum, desire not to be
pilloried, then legislators avoid potential blame or

responsibility. The reallocation offers the legislator the
ability to claim credit for encouraging private charitable
efforts, but unlike delegation to an administrative agency,
the legislator does not remain ultimately responsible for the
actions of the charitable community.
Knauer, supra note 6, at 1068.
259. For a discussion of the potential benefits see Knauer, supra note 6.
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payments are tax-deductible, carry advertising value and goodwill, and
represent access to policy making.
3. Rent-extracting Politicians
Instead of the interest group extracting rent in the form of influence,
it is possible to view the politician as extracting rents from business in the
form of contributions to a GCCO. 2" This is based on the model of a
politician as a rent-extracting actor developed in tax reform scholarship. 26'
The Corporation for National Service provides a possible example of this
type of behavior because it is a pet project of the administration in search
of funding, rather than a pet project of business in search of access to
government policy development.
Politicians could be viewed as rent extractors who pressure
corporations to contribute to GCCOs. Although the politicians do not
benefit directly, as in the case of campaign contributions, they are able to
fund a given project about which they feel strongly from an ideological
standpoint. 62 They might also be obligated to support the project as a
result of agreements with other parties.2 63 Finally, they could simply want
the benefit of being able to claim credit for the program without having to
commit the required funding. In this way, the creation of a GCCO is
superior to delegating authority to an administrative body because
260. Typically, legislators are not considered to be rent-seeking actors. Instead, they
dispense rents in the form of legislation or other regulation. The interest group theory
of legislation views each piece of legislation as a wealth transfer. Legislators broker these
wealth transfers by matching the demand for legislation with the supply. The costs of
collective action dictate that the demand come from relatively small groups with intense
particularized needs. It is then easy for the legislator to place the cost of the desired

legislation on diffuse and unorganized constituencies. The fee for the brokerage services
is generally campaign contributions. However, in the case of purchasing the opportunity

to influence federal policy through a GCCO, the fee is paid in the form of contribution
payments. For a discussion of the legislator as broker see MCCORMICK & TOLLISON,
supra note 246, at 2.
261. See Fred McChesney, Regulation, Taxes, and Political Extortion, in
REGULATION AND THE REAGAN ERA: POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE PUBLIC

INTEREST 233-35 (Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1989). For a criticism of this

view see Shaviro, supra note 38, at 71.
262. For a discussion of the role of ideology in the behavior of legislators see
Dwight R. Lee, Ideology, Politics, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191
(1988).
263. Logrolling refers to the practice of vote trading among legislators. It is thought
to be necessary to secure support for minority backed legislation. For a discussion of
logrolling see MUELLER, supranote 244, at 82-87.
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Congress does not remain accountable for the success or failure of the
program. 26
The potential for rent extraction in the case of a GCCO might explain
the preoccupation with corporate rather than individual contributions as a
primary source of funding. Corporations may be more susceptible to
government
pressure in the form of veiled threats of regulation or higher
265
taxes.
V. GOVERNMENT CREATED CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
AND Two ECONOMIC MODELS
Any level of comparative analysis involving the charitable sector is
necessarily constrained by our limited understanding of the workings of the
charitable sector, 266 and lack agreement as to where the sector even ends
and the public and private sectors begin. 267 The enthusiastic entry of the
264. See Knauer, supranote 6, at 1062-72 (discussing the benefits of the reallocation
of responsibility for certain social services to the private charitable sector).
265. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339,
361 (1988) (noting that McChesney's rent extraction theory helps explain "a range of
government gestures in the direction of industry: for example, committee investigations
and hearings, political speeches mapping out new legislative proposals, and government
commissions to study 'problems'").
266. The types of organizations described by any of the three modes of
categorization- nonprofit, third, or charitable-represent an incredibly varied and diverse
group that cuts across numerous industry types and derives revenue from a variety of
sources. The use of the term "charitable" refers to those organizations that comply with
the requirements of § 501(c)(3) and § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. §§
501(c)(3), 170 (1994).
267. The first difficulty arises in trying to demarcate three separate and distinct
institutions, particularly when using a term as slippery as "charitable." Reinvention likes
to make the distinction between nonprofit and for profit. Osborne and Gaebler refer to
the charitable sector as the "third sector" and craft a definition that excludes some
nonprofit charitable firms while including for-profit firms-focusing instead on whether
the organization exists to "accumulate private wealth." OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supranote
1, at 44. Representatives of charitable organizations refer to the sector as the Independent
Sector. Peter Dobkin Hall notes that "[t]he starting point for any serious consideration
of the place of nonprofits in the American polity is to accept the policy implications of
the scholarly recognition of sectoral interpenetration: that the nonprofit sector is a
dependent sector, not an independent one." HALL, supra note 49, at 106.
Additionally, the charitable sector is related to both government and private industry
through overlapping personnel who occupy positions in the various sectors throughout
their careers or simultaneously serve on the governing boards of charitable organizations
while being employed by the government or private industry. See HALL, supranote 49,
at 102-03 (summarizing "the intersectoral configuration as a network of patronage and
personal relationships"). See also USEEM, supra note 240, at 25 (noting that "the
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federal government into the charitable sector merits a reexamination of the
conventional wisdom regarding the formation of charitable organizations.
This section begins a discussion that hopefully others will continue. It
looks at the two most widely accepted theories of the formation of
charitable organizations: the market or government failure theory26 and
the contract failure theory.269
The attributes of the charitable sector identified by the reinventing
government literature are based strongly on both theories. For example,
charitable organizations are described as the "preferredmechanism for
providing collective goods.""7 ° They are also recommended when there
27
is a need for "extensive trust on the part of customers or clients." '
Because it is driven by political pressures to provide desired social services
without increasing federal spending, 72 reinventing government does not
assess critically whether the charitable sector is indeed as described. 273
The result is a comparative analysis that is based on not only a reductive,
but also an idealized, model of the sector. The actual characteristics of the
charitable sector are secondary to the belief that GCCOs offer increased
efficiency and access to nontax revenue.
A. Market or Government Failure
Under the market failure theory, charitable organizations form to
correct for the undersupply of collective or public goods. 74 Collective
goods are those that are enjoyed by all consumers regardless of who bears
involvement of corporate leadership in the affairs of nonprofit organizations constitutes
a seldom acknowledged but highly important part of business's political outreach.")
268. See infra text accompanying notes 274-82.
269. See infra text accompanying notes 283-300.
270. OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1, at 44 (quoting Lester Salamon).
271. Id. at 46. Osborne and Gaebler conclude:

The third sector tends to be best at performing tasks that generate little or no

profit, demand compassion and commitment to individuals, require extensive
trust on the part of customers or clients, need hands-on, personal attention
(such as day care, counseling, and services to the handicapped or ill), and
involve the enforcement of moral codes and individual responsibility for

behavior.
Id.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 35-45.
273. This criticism applies to any comparative institutional analysis using the
charitable sector as one of the relevant institutions.
274. See generally BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY (1988);
BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1977) [hereinafter VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT].
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the cost of providing the goods.275 The classic examples are a strong
national defense and clean air. A rational consumer has no incentive to
contribute to the cost of these goods because, once provided, no one can
be excluded from enjoying them. This lack of consumer incentive is
known as the "free-rider" effect.276
An unregulated market will always undersupply collective goods, and
in certain instances the government will intervene and correct for this
undersupply. 2 "7 Except in the case of interest group capture, the demand
on the part of a relatively small group is generally not sufficient to prompt
government action. However, an intense demand among a relatively small
group of consumers can prompt the formation of a private charitable
organization. Thus, in the face of government disinterest, certain highly
motivated consumers will overcome free-rider obstacles and organize to
insure the private supply of collective goods. Tax subsidies provide a
further incentive and help to reduce the cost of collective action.278
The formation of a GCCO starts with the recognition by the
government that a specific service should be provided on the federal level.
In that regard, true government failure is not present.27 9 Instead, there is
a funding failure. The decision has been made that the program is
necessary, but funding is not available for its delivery.
With a GCCO the government acts as a charitable entrepreneur.2 80
Presumably, it does so in response to consumer demand or interest group
capture. In the first instance, there is arguably a broad base of support for
the public goods produced by the GCCO, but an unwillingness or inability
on the part of the government to fund the provision of the collective goods
directly. The existence of this broad base of support gives some credence
to the de facto creation of a preferred class of charitable organizations
discussed in Part IV. 2 ' GCCOs could be viewed as an intermediate group
275. See generally MANCUR
276. Id. at 16.

OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

(1965).

277. See VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT, supra note 274, at I (describing government as
a "corrective institution").
278. See Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax-Induced Distortions in the Voluntary Sector, 39
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 670 (1988-1989) (discussing charitable tax incentives as "a
corrective measure for [a] basic problem in resource allocation," namely, the undersupply
of goods with beneficial externalities).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 162-81 (describing the circumstances

surrounding the creation of a GCCO).
280. The presence of an entrepreneur is one of the factors collective choice scholars
have identified as important in overcoming the incentive to free ride. Additional factors
include group size, selective incentives, penalties, and political motivations.

281. See supra text accompanying notes 235-43.
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of organizations with broad public support for their purposes, but
insufficient government funding.282
B. Contract Failure
The contract failure theory focuses on why certain firms elect to
organize subject to the nondistribution constraint. 2 3 For purposes of
charitable organizations, the nondistribution constraint is expressed as the
prohibition against "private inurement "2'4 and the requirement that the
organizational documents provide for the distribution of the assets to other
charities upon dissolution. 285 Contract failure theory attempts to explain
the choice between the nonprofit and for-profit firm. This elemental
choice of entity question, however, can be recast as one of institutional
choice. The question becomes: Under what circumstances will consumers
favor the provision of goods28by
6 the charitable sector rather than the private
sector or the public sector?
282. In the alternative, if the creation of a GCCO is the result of interest group
capture, then there is no broad based public support-rather there is simply the
government endorsement of the interests of a small group. The endorsement itself is
lukewarm. Although the government will incur the cost to establish the organization of
the GCCO, it will not commit to fund the organization beyond initial seed money or
partial funding. It, in effect, lends its name to the endeavor, agrees to help with
fundraising, but will not write a sustaining check.
283. See Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L. J. 835,
845 (1980) (describing the nondistribution constraint as the common attribute of nonprofit
organizations); Henry Hansmann, The Rationalefor Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981) [hereinafter Rationale
Exempting] (explaining tax exemption as necessary to compensate for the nonprofit's
inability to attract investment capital due to the nondistribution constraint).
284. In order to qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3), "no part of the net
earnings" of the organization may "inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). This means that individuals can receive only
reasonable compensation for goods or services. They cannot share in the profits of the
organization. See I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGANIZATION HANDBOOK (IRM 7751) § 342.1(1)
(stating that "aprivate shareholder or individual cannot pocket the organization's funds
except as reasonable payment for goods or services").
285. This requirement insures that the assets of a charitable organization are imposed
with a perpetual charitable trust. Upon dissolution, any assets remaining after the
settlement of debts must be transferred to another charitable organization. This way the
assets are never returned to a private individual. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501.
286. The introduction of the government as an alternative provider should also give
rise to a discussion of why the for-profit sector is preferred over government. See
OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1.
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Like the market failure explanation, under the contract failure theory,
charitable organizations form as a result of consumer demand. However,
the demand is not for collective goods themselves, but rather a specific
mode of delivery. 2s
Charitable organizations are prohibited from
distributing net earnings. This nondistribution constraint is desired by a
consumer where it is difficult for the consumer to assess the quality of the
service provided. A common example is a hospital or skilled nursing care
facility, although both also exist in a for-profit noncharitable form. The
existence of the nondistribution constraint assures the wary consumer that
the service provider will not exploit the asymmetric information to
maximize its profit.288
Contract failure is most often applied in the case of organizations that
provide complex consumer services and, therefore, obtain the bulk of their
revenue in the form of fees for services. 289 The explanation also applies
to donation-based organizations that provide direct services to individuals
or groups other than the donor. 29 In such case, the donor is thought to
"purchase" other-regarding charitable services.29 For example, a donor
to a homeless advocacy organization has no means, short of costly
monitoring, to determine whether his donation has "bought" the
appropriate amount of advocacy services for the intended beneficiary
group.292 The nondistribution constraint insures that the charitable
organization will not exploit the information imbalance.
The nondistribution constraint explains why consumers might prefer
a charitable organization to a for-profit organization, but it does not
287. This only applies in the case of charitable organizations providing donationbased collective goods.

In the case of charitable organizations providing complex

personal services, their formation is not due to the undersupply of collective goods. The
concern is the quality of the goods.
288. Hansmann identified "[clomplex personal services such as day care and
residential nursing care" as the type of services the quality of which consumers could not
easily evaluate. See Rationale Exempting, supranote 283, at 69-70. This is why nursing
homes routinely advertise their nonprofit status. Until recent scandals, consumers
assumed donation-based charities were trustworthy. State solicitation rules are a

consumer protection response to charity scandals.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 69. (noting that it would be very difficult and costly for the
donor/consumer to monitor the quality of disaster relief actually provided by the Red
Cross (i.e., the donee organization)). Each GCCO discussed in this Article provides
collective goods.
291. See Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 27, 29- 30 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987)

(restating the contract failure theory and noting that a donor is "a purchaser of services").
292. See id.
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explain the preference for charitable organizations over government
provided services. Consumer preference for charitable organizations is due
to the absence of the goal of profit maximization. Government programs,
however, do not threaten to exploit asymmetric information in order to
maximize profits. One explanation is that consumers trust charitable
organizations over government because government lacks an incentive to
provide quality goods. In the case of the private sector, the goal of profit
maximization provides the incentive, while in the charitable community,
incentive comes from the ideological commitment of those individuals who
choose to work in the sector.293 Both are arguably missing in the case of
government provided goods. When government provides collective goods
there is still the problem of costly monitoring on the part of the
consumer/taxpayer to determine the quality, and perhaps, quantity of the
goods provided.294
Compared with government programs, consumers might prefer
charitable organizations because the ideological commitment of those
working in the sector provides a greater incentive to produce quality goods
at the appropriate level. Although an interesting possibility, government
employees could share the same level of commitment to the public since
they also work without the goal of profit maximization. In fact, William
Niskanen's analysis of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat specifically
includes charitable organizations, suggesting that the employee of the
government agency and the employee of the local soup kitchen may
actually belong to the same model.295
A GCCO indicates that in certain instances consumers trust the
charitable sector over either the private or public sectors, particularly for
the provision of certain collective goods. It is this consumer trust that
makes consumers voluntarily contribute to charitable organizations, but not
to government programs. 29' The notion that taxpayers (i.e., consumers)
lack trust in government is one of the central themes of reinventing
government. 29' Gore's admonition to "put customers first" is an attempt
to restore taxpayer confidence in the government delivery of services.
Calculated use of a GCCO to implement federal policy is an attempt to
exploit the consumer trust associated with charitable organizations. This
293. See id.
294. There is an argument that monitoring is undertaken by elected representatives
on behalf of consumer/taxpayers.
295. See NISKANEN, supra note 246.
296. See supra note 74 (discussing the donors who contribute to the federal

government each year).
297. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1.
298. See PERFORMANCE REvIEW, supra note 1, at 57.
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is particularly troubling since it is exactly this breakdown in consumer
confidence that reinvention seeks to remedy.
The fact that consumers might trust charitable organizations over
government run programs or private industry is very different from the
determination that charitable organizations warrant such trust. Is it the
case that the nondistribution constraint makes charitable organizations less
likely to exploit an information imbalance? The employees of some
charitable organizations, particularly those providing complex personal
services, can receive very generous, albeit, "reasonable" compensation
packages. 29 9 In addition, the absence of a profit maximization goal could
lead to waste and inefficiency. Finally, recent scandals in the charitable
community suggest a crisis in monitoring." °
The nondistribution
constraint does not serve any utility if it is not enforced.
VI. CONCLUSION

GCCOs represent just one attempt by an entrepreneurial government
to provide better services without increasing taxes.3", The pragmatic
concerns that gave rise to GCCOs have overshadowed the promise of the
comparative institutional analysis endorsed by reinventing government. A
comparative institutional analysis requires the identification of a goal, the
relevant institutions, and the measure by which to judge the relative
benefits of the various institutions.30 2 Currently, the analysis lacks three
things: (i) a sufficiently expansive analysis of the costs associated with
GCCOs; (ii) a measure of equity to complement that of efficiency; and (iii)
a comprehensive understanding of the charitable sector.
Innovation is at the heart of reinventing government. It is important,
however, not to advocate innovation for its own sake. GCCOs may offer
increased efficiency and access to nontax revenue,30 3 but they also carry
299. See Debra E. Blum, et al., Top Dollarfor Charities' Top Leaders, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY, Sept. 19, 1996, at 1 (noting the high salaries of the top charity

executives).
300. See, e.g., Kristin A. Goss, A Crises of Credibilityfor America's Non-profits,
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, June 15, 1993, at 1.
301. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 1 at 31 (discussing 36 alternative
delivery forms); see also supra note 41 (discussing recommendations of the National
Performance Review).
302. See supratext accompanying notes 35-41.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51 (discussing the advantages of

GCCOs).
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certain potential costs, such as their impact on the charitable community' °4
and on their corporate donors. 0 5 These potential costs must be considered

in order to determine whether GCCOs really work better and cost less than
the other institutional alternatives.

Accordingly, the comparative

institutional analysis must employ an expanded measure of efficiency that
is sufficient to include these various externalities.
From a larger standpoint, institutional choice practiced by government
should expressly incorporate a measure of equity." 6 Without this
consideration, GCCOs remain vulnerable to a pervasive criticism of
private charity, namely that it reflects the interests, tastes, and needs of
those in society with the greatest resources. 0 7 GCCOs form only after a
304. The impact on the charitable community includes increased competition for the
charitable dollar and the emergence of a preferred class of charitable organizations. See
supra text accompanying notes 221-43.
305. The "voluntary" nature of corporate contributions to GCCOs means that certain
corporations bear a disproportionate share of the cost of certain social programs. In
addition, the fact that representatives of major donors often serve on the governing bodies
of GCCOs indicates that corporate donors are presented with an opportunity to influence
federal social policy. See supra text accompanying notes 186-221 (explaining the
selective assessment on certain corporations and the invitation to influence policy).
306. See Rubin, supra note 21 (describing a measure for the relative benefits of
alternate institutions as a combination of efficiency and "social justice"). Concerns over
equity are also a constant criticism of the tax expenditure for charitable contributions. See
supra note 86 (discussing tax expenditure theory). For example, the tax expenditure is
only available for individual taxpayers who "itemize" their deductions (i.e., aggregate of
allowable itemized deductions, as reduced and limited by applicable floors and ceilings,
exceeds the standard deduction). As a result, many taxpayers and all nontaxpayers do not
get to participate in the tax expenditure budget for charitable contributions. Moreover,
higher income taxpayers are able to direct a greater portion of the tax expenditure budget
because the tax savings is a function of the taxpayer's highest marginal rate of tax. See
supra note 91 (discussing after-tax cost of deductible charitable contribution). This is
referred to this as the "upside down" effect of tax expenditures. See STANLEY S.
SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 72 (1984).
307. Salamon described this limitation of private charity as "philanthropic
paternalism." He said that the institution of private charity "vests most of the influence
over the definition of community needs in the hands of those in command of the greatest
resources." Salamon, supra note 48, at 112 (explaining "philanthropic paternalism").
This is a relatively benign picture of the potential influence over charitable ends. The
brief public choice analysis provided above illustrates how GCCOs could facilitate rentseeking behavior on the part of both politicians and corporate donors. See supra text
accompanying notes 244-65. Of course, the potential for wasteful rent-seeking behavior
exists where the service is provided directly by the government. In such case, there is
arguably greater opportunity for public oversight. The unique feature of GCCOs is that
continued government involvement potentially secures "rents," but the private nature of
a GCCO further obscures the rent-seeking behavior.
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two part determination that (i) a given service should be provided on the
federal level30 s and (ii) the delivery of the service would work best and
cost less in the charitable sector. 0 9 Thus, GCCOs exercise quasigovernment authority or at least discharge a quasi-government function.
It is appropriate to include a measure of equity when weighing the relative
benefits of the competing sectors, particularly where the "service"
involved is the development of federal policy.31 0
In the case of a GCCO, it is not immediately clear whether to impose
the measure of equity on the beneficiary level or on the policy level. On
the beneficiary level, the requirement imposed by the federal tax code that
charitable organizations serve a public rather than a private purpose should
insure that GCCOs benefit a sufficiently broad charitable class. 31 ' This
requirement, however, will not insure broad based representation at the
policy level. For example, the board of directors of NASDC is comprised
exclusively of industry representatives and Walter Annenberg. 31 2 More
balanced representation on the policy level might include representatives
of the intended beneficiary group, community representatives, donors,
experts, and government officials. 1 3 If some form of broad based
representation is desired, then a government corporation might be
preferable because the government can retain the ability to control the
composition of the governing body.31 4
Even with an expanded definition of efficiency and the addition of an
equity measure, there remains the inherent limitation in any comparative
institutional analysis involving the charitable sector, namely lack of
information concerning the nature of the sector.31 5 The ability to choose
308. See supra note 170 (discussing the decision to provide a given service on the
federal level).
309. See supra text accompanying notes 161-81 (explaining the process of weighing
the relative benefits of the alternate institutions).
310. NASDC is a good example of a GCCO that develops and then implements
federal social policy. See supra text accompanying notes 126-43 (describing NASDC).
311. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(ii). "[I]t is necessary for an organization
to establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as
designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or
persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests." Id.
312. See Miller, supra note 137, at 12; Greg McDonald, LargestDonation Ever to
Public Education, HOUSTON. CHRON., Dec. 18, 1993, at A20 (discussing that Walter
Annenberg, who made his fortune by selling T.V. Guide, donated $500 million to
NASDC).
313. See Whiting, supra note 219, at 777; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 129.
314. See supratextaccompanying notes 52-67 (describing government corporations).
315. See supratext accompanying notes 266-69 (describing the absence of a positive

theory of charitable organizations).
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among institutions requires an ability to describe the competing
institutions. Reinventing government bases its characterization of the
charitable sector on the uncritical acceptance of the market or government
failure theory 316 and contract failure theory. 317 For example, it advocates
using a GCCO where "consumer trust" is important, but it never asks
whether charitable organizations warrant such consumer trust.3"' At the
same time reinventing government uses these theories to inform
institutional choice, the very existence of GCCOs prompt a reevaluation
of the underlying theories.3 ' 9 For example, the emergence of the
government as a charitable entrepreneur undermines the notion of
government failure as the impetus for charitable organizations. It also
could give rise to a preferred government-sponsored class of charitable
organizations
that have certain advantages in attracting corporate
320
support.
Reinventing government represents that latest instance where policy is
based on unquestioned assumptions regarding the charitable sector.32' The
New Federalism of the Reagan era saw the beginning of a reallocation of
responsibility for the provision of certain social services from the federal
government to the charitable sector. 3'
Each year significant tax
expenditures are provided to encourage giving to charitable
organizations. 3 2 The assumptions underlying these choices include a
strong belief that the charitable sector is more efficient than the
government and that it lessens the burdens of government.324 They must
be tested before becoming any more enshrined in our political conventional

316. See supra text accompanying notes 274-82 (explaining the market or

government failure theory).
317. See supra text accompanying notes 283-300 (explaining the contract failure
theory).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 299-300 (noting that the proposition that

consumers trust charitable organizations is very different from stating that charitable
organizations warrant such trust).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 266-72 (explaining the need to reexamine
the accepted theories).
320. See supratext accompanying notes 235-43 (describing the potential for creating
such a class of organizations).
321. See supra note 24 (discussing related assumptions concerning tax incentives).
322. See Knauer, supranote 6 (providing a detailed account of this reallocation).
323. See supra note 86 (explaining the tax expenditure theory).

324. See Knauer, supranote 6.
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wisdom. If not, reinventing government risks exploiting unexamined
consumer trust to convert an otherwise unsympathetic government program
into a worthwhile charitable cause.3"

325. See supra note 74 (discussing that charitable organizations offer access to
nontax revenue because generally taxpayers do not elect to contribute to the federal
government).

